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INTRODUCTION

The essence of the employment relationship lies in the willing
subordination of the worker to the employer’s control.1 Employment and
labor laws were created to counteract the inequality of bargaining power
and potential for exploitation inherent in this control relationship.2 Thus
“employees” receive protections such as anti-discrimination mandates,
family and medical leave, minimum wage and overtime protections,

1. See Guy Davidov, Mark Freedland & Nicola Koutouris, The Subjects of Labor Law:
“Employees” and Other Workers, R SCH. H ANDBOOK IN C OMPAR. L AB. L. 115, 119
(Matthew Finkin & Guy Mundlak eds., 2015).
2. OTTO KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 6 (2d ed. 1977); PAUL DAVIS & MARK
FRIEDLAND, KAHN-FRUEND’S LABOR AND THE LAW, 18 (3d ed. 1983).
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unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation schemes. Labor
law protects the concerted activities of “employees” for mutual aid and
protection when they join a union.3 Workers who do not qualify as
employees are labeled “independent contractors” and do not receive such
protections; they are expected to protect themselves through market
processes and contractual bargaining.
Rideshare firms and other so-called “gig economy” firms purport to
increase business efficiency through technology and a workforce made
up of independent contractors. In reality, however, the rideshare
industry’s primary innovations do not reduce costs, but merely shift them
from the firm onto drivers and third parties.4 This is achieved not through
technology, but one-sided contracts and regulatory arbitrage.5 Rideshare
firms pay drivers low net wages while shifting a large portion of
production costs onto them—most prominently the costs of owning and
operating vehicles.6
Moreover, they avoid costs by insisting that their drivers are
“independent contractors” and not “employees.” The firms claim they are
not transportation businesses, but technological “platforms”that enable
passengers and independent drivers to find each other and make ride
transactions.7 Uber has gone so far as to claim that because its business is a
technology platform, the work drivers perform is “outside the course of

3. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
4. Hubert Horan, Will the Growth Of Uber Increase Economic Welfare?, 44 TRANSP. L.
J. 33, 42–45 (2017).
5. Regulatory arbitrage is “the practice of operating a business to take maximum
advantage of the prevailing regulatory environment (as opposed to delivering the maximum
amount of value to the business’s customers), usually at the expense of consumers,
competitors, or taxpayers, as the case may be.” AT&T Commc’ns. of Cal., Inc. v. Pac-West
Telecomm., Inc., 651 F.3d 980, 984 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011).
6. Horan, supra note 4, at 45–46. In the taxi business, the drivers bear about 67% of
costs and the taxi company about 33%, of which 18% are vehicle costs and the remainder
overhead. Id. at 45. Thus, taxi companies would bear only 15% of costs if they could shift
vehicle costs onto drivers. Id. When borne by individual drivers, these costs—vehicles,
financing, insurance and maintenance—are likely higher, since economies of scale are lost.
Id. at 46 n.26.
7. E.g., Greg Bensinger, Uber: The Ride-Hailing App That Says It Has ‘Zero’ Drivers,
WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2019, 1:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/10/14/uber-ride-hailing-app-that-says-it-has-zero- drivers/; Lyft, Inc.,
Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1 Registration Statement 102 (Form S-1) (Mar. 18, 2019)
[hereinafter Lyft, Inc., Amendment].
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Uber’s usual business.”8 Treating drivers as independent contractors
relieves rideshare companies from complying with employment law
requirements such as overtime pay, health care, and employment taxes,
and allows for the shifting of these costs onto drivers and the public.
Independent contractor status also helps firms avoid tort liability for their
drivers’ conduct, again shifting costs onto drivers and tort victims.
Indeed, the firms publicly acknowledge that their business model relies
on legally classifying drivers as independent contractors. In its IPO filing
documents, under the required disclosure of “Risk Factors,” Uber states,
“Our business would beadversely affected if Drivers were classified as
employees instead of independent contractors.”9 Lyft’s IPO filing
similarly states, “If the contractor classification of drivers that use our
platform is challenged, there may be adverse business, financial, tax,
legal and other consequences.”10
States have traditionally based the applicability of employment law
on a common-law definition of “employee.” Derived from the law of
“master and servant,” it turns on whether a principal has the legal right to
control an agent.11 The firms carefully structure their contracts with
drivers to keep costs down and avoid the appearance of an employment
relationship. The common-law test has produced conflicting results,
however, and some states have protected drivers by statute. The industry
has responded by aggressively and successfully lobbying in other states
for legislation classifying drivers as independent contractors.
Drivers have little bargaining power in the face of rideshare firms’
one-sided contracts that deny them the protections of employment law.
Rideshare firms enjoy a significant bargaining advantage because of
declining real wages and the need for flexible work to accommodate child
care and supplement insufficient incomes. Furthermore, only two firms,
Uber and Lyft, control practically the entire U.S. rideshare market.12 Uber

8. Bensinger, supra note 7.
9. Uber Techs., Inc., Registration Statement 28 (Form S-1) (Apr. 11, 2019) [hereinafter
Uber Techs., Inc., Registration Statement].
10. Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement 11 (Form S-1) (Mar. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Lyft,
Inc., Registration Statement].
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
12. Dierdre Bosa, Lyft Claims It Now Has More Than One-Third of the US Ride-Sharing
Market, CNBC (May 14, 2018, 8:23 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/14/lyft-marketshare-051418-bosa-sf.html. While Lyft is focused in North America, Uber has a wider
international presence, where it competes with local rivals. Tina Bellon, Uber and LyftTake
Different Roads in Search of Profit, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2020, 2:53 PM),
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holds a commanding share with two-thirds to three-fourths of the market;
Lyft holds virtually all the remainder.13 If Uber’s drivers were counted as
employees, it would be New York City’s “largest for-profit private
employer.”14 The dominance of thesetwo firms is self-reinforcing due to
network effects: more riders use the dominant apps because more drivers
do, and vice versa.15
The contractual and political strategies of rideshare companies
threaten to deny their workers the protections of labor and employment
law. To address the power imbalance between drivers and rideshare
companies, a new paradigm must replace labor and employment law. The
law should permit drivers to organize collectively for the purpose of
bargaining with rideshare firms.16 Collective bargaining constitutes an
agreement among workers (who are typically in mutual competition)
not to compete on the basis of wages, benefits and/or working
conditions.17 Thus, labor organizing may constitute anticompetitive
concerted action and potentially violate antitrust law. Indeed, when the
Sherman Antitrust Act was first passed, it was used more often against
unions than corporations.18 Today, the National Labor Relations Act
protects the right of “employees” to organize with respect to wages and
working conditions,19 and the Clayton Act exempts such concerted action
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-lyft/uber-and-lyft-take-different-roads-in-search-ofprofit-idUSKBN2012I1.
13. Bosa, supra note 12; Kate Conger, Uber’s First Earnings Report After I.P.O.: $1
Billion Loss, N.Y. TIMES (May30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/technology/
uber-stock-earnings.html.
14. Sen Li et al., Regulating TNCs: Should Uber and Lyft Set Their Own Rules?, 129
TRANSP. RES. PART B: METHODOLOGICAL 193, 194 (2019).
15. Alex Hemingway, What’s Missing From the Uber Debate? Market Power,
Congestions, Pollution, and Even Deaths, POLICYNOTE (Nov. 26, 2018),
https://www.policynote.ca/whats-missing-from-the-uber-debate/.
16. Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust
Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1566–67 (2018); see also Marshall
Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
45, 46 (2019).
17. Cf., e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws.’ Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 422–23 (1990)
(holding a boycott by court-appointed attorneys for indigent defendants in order to obtain
higher prices for their services was an unreasonable restraint on trade and a violation of the
Sherman Act); Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692–93, 695 (1978)
(holding a ban on competitive bidding among engineers is not price fixing per se, but
anticompetitive and an unreasonable restraint on competition).
18. Lao, supra note 16, at 1560.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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from antitrust law.20 While the NLRA does not prohibit such action by
independent contractors, the Clayton Act does not exempt it from
antitrust scrutiny. Thus, favorable antitrust standards could open the door
to collective bargaining by drivers.
In recent decades, U.S. antitrust law has become more and more
lenient toward mergers and concerted action by business firms. It has
continued to limit workers’ power to combine by agreement
“horizontally,” even as it has become more lenient toward large firms’
use of contract to exercise “vertical” control over smaller independent
contractors and other economically weakerparties.21 We argue that this
asymmetry should be rectified. As one commentator argues, “the value of
competition underlying our antitrust laws must accommodate the value of
empowering workers in seeking fair wages and good working
conditions.”22
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Ohio v. American Express
upheld a “platform” firm’s restrictions on its independent contractors
under a novel and unusually permissive antitrust analysis.23 According to
the Court, when a platform company mediates between two groups, as when
a credit card company mediates between merchants and shoppers, all
three parties constitute a network that produces a single product: a
transaction.24 The special nature of this product led the Court to employ
a lenient antitrust analysis of the contract at issue. Rideshare app
companies describe themselves similarly as transaction platforms in a
network with drivers and riders. The American Express decision should
require courts to examine all the contracts involving members of a
platform network with the same leniency. Because of the opinion’s
lenience toward apps’ contractual restraints on independent contractors,
the latter should receive similarly permissive treatment when they
combine via contract in response to such restraints. The Court’s platform
analysis is consistent with contemporary corporate theory’s de-emphasis
20. 15 U.S.C. § 17.
21. Cf. Steinbaum, supra note 16, at 46 (“[A]ntitrust has contributed to the increasing
imbalance of power between employers and workers [in two ways] . . . . First, antitrust has
legalized vertical restraints, allowing the economy’s most powerful actors to closely direct
and supervise the behavior of less-powerful actors. Second, antitrust has been used by those
same powerful actors to prevent less-powerful actors from organizing and coordinating on
their own behalf against such concentrations of power.”).
22. Lao, supra note 16, at 1566.
23. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
24. Id. at 2280.
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on the artificial boundaries of a business firm in favor of the network of
contracts that is the real engine of production.
More generally, American Express is an extreme example of
antitrust law’s tendency to apply deferential review of the business
decisions of firms, especially in novel economic contexts. Collective
bargaining can ameliorate the bargaining power disparities between
drivers and rideshare firms and counteract the anticompetitive tendencies
of this highly concentrated industry. The relaxation of antitrust law as
applied to firms appears to show a preference for free markets and
contracting to provide economic solutions. Unless the state’s approach to
the gig economy is intended to favor capital over labor, it should
facilitate, not proscribe, labor’s attempt to address the peculiarities of the
gig labor market with contract-based solutions.
II.

THE EMPLOYMENT LAW CHALLENGE

The rideshare driver model purports to upend the very essence of the
employment relationship, which lies in the willing subordination of the
worker to the employer’s control.25 Rideshare companies claim that
drivers are not their employees. Indeed, the business model of the
industry relies on legally classifying drivers as independent contractors.
In the required disclosure of “Risk Factors” in its IPO registration
documents, Uber states, “Our business would be adversely affected if
Drivers were classified as employees instead of independent
contractors.”26 Similarly, Lyft’s IPO form states, “If the contractor
classification of drivers that use our platform is challenged, there may be
adverse business, financial, tax, legal and other consequences.”27 Treating
drivers as independent contractors relieves rideshare companies from
complying with costly employment regulations, such as overtime pay,
health care, benefits, and employment taxes. Although the rideshare
model purports to increase efficiency through technology, in fact its
primary advantage over taxi companies is not cost reduction, but cost
shifting, from the firm to drivers and credulous investors.28 In addition to
avoiding the requirements of employment law and denying them to
drivers, rideshare firms shift vehicle costs, a major cost factor for taxi

25. Davidov, supra note 1, at 5.
26. Uber Techs., Inc., Registration Statement, supra note 9, at 28.
27. Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement, supra note 10, at 18.
28. Horan, supra note 4, at 44–46.
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businesses, onto their “independent contractors.”29
To deny being employers, rideshare firms claim they merely provide
a platform that enables willing customers to connect with willing service
providers. This is the business model of the broader platform economy,
in which companies position themselves as intermediaries, catalysts, or
opportunity makers, providing the platform through which economic or
market interactions can occur. They refer to themselves as infrastructure
builders, thereby distancing themselves from the work that rideshare
drivers ultimately provide to riders. Lyft’s IPO filing states, “We provide
a service to drivers to complete a successful transportation service for
riders. This service includes on-demand lead generation that assists
drivers to find, receive and fulfill on-demand requests from riders,”30
portraying drivers as neither employees nor independent contractors, but
as, like riders,customers who use Lyft’s services. Rideshare companies’
purported business model is summed up in Uber’s operational statement:
“On-demand transportation technology is our core service, and the app
that connects driver-partners and riders is what makes it all possible.”31
Lyft’s terms of service, applicable to both drivers and riders who use the
app, state: “Lyft does not provide transportation services, and Lyft is not
a transportation carrier . . . . We have no control over the quality or safety
of the transportation that occurs as a result of the Rideshare Services.”32
Rideshare companies further downplay drivers’ central role in their
business by drawing attention to their other, smaller lines of business. As
Uber describes its business in its IPO filing:
Our massive, efficient, and intelligent network consists of tens of millions of
Drivers, consumers, restaurants, shippers, carriers, and dockless e-bikes and e-

29. Id. at 45–46; see also text accompanying note 6.
30. Lyft, Inc., Amendment, supra note 7, at 102.
31. How to Use the Uber App, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/about/how-does-uberwork/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
32. Terms of Service, LYFT (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.lyft.com/terms. Similarly,
Uber’s terms of service for riders state, in all capital letters, “YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT
YOUR ABILITY TO OBATAIN TRANSPORTATION . . . THROUGH THE USE OF THE
SERVICES DOES NOT ESTABLISH UBER AS A PROVIDER OF TRANSPORTATION
. . . .” U.S. Terms of Use, UBER (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.uber.com/legal/en/document/?
country=united-states&lang=en&name=general-terms-of-use.
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scooters,33 as well asunderlying data, technology, and shared infrastructure.34

Rideshare companies have appealed to drivers by purporting to
exercise less control than employers do. Rideshare companies argue that
drivers’ degree of autonomy renders traditional employment laws
inapplicable.35 Unlike employees, they argue, drivers can set their own
schedules; drive wherever and whenever they want; decide how long and
how often they want to work; hire other drivers to work for them; decide
what kind of car to drive; and maintain ownership and control of their
vehicles.
Despite Uber’s attempts to characterize itself as merely a virtual
platform, Uber’s purpose statement reveals that rideshare companies
cannot operate without drivers, even as they expand into other businesses.
In a rideshare “network,” drivers are no less integral than the platform. In
addition to providing rides, drivers generate data about routes, traffic
patterns, their hours on the job, and average length of rides through their
activity.36 Uber uses this data, in turn, to generate other business growth
opportunities.37
This Part addresses the importance of the employee/independent
contractor distinction under current labor and employment law, and the
ways in which the platform economy has eroded the distinctions between
employees and independent contractors. It discusses the judicial,
legislative, and administrative developments relevant to rideshare work.
It includes a discussion of rideshare companies’ successful campaign to
get states to pass laws declaring drivers independent contractors. The
result has been to weaken, or even moot, the common-law tests that courts
traditionally use to determine whether a worker is an employee. It

33. Uber has since sold its Jump e-bike operation. Sam Shead, Uber Sends Thousands of
Electric Bikes and Scooters to the Scrapheap after Lime Deal, CNBC (May 28, 2020, 8:31
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/28/uber-bikes- scrapped.html. Lyft has scaled back its
e-scooter operations. Fernando Alfonso III, Lyft is Pulling its Scooters from Cities Across the
US, CNN (Nov. 18, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/16/business/lyftscooters-removed-atlanta-dallas-nashville-trnd/index.html.
34. Uber Techs., Inc., Registration Statement, supra note 9, at 1.
35. See Julia Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The Postindustrial Corporation
and Advanced InformationTechnology, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 67–70 (2016).
36. See ALEX ROSENBLAT, UBERLAND: HOW ALGORITHMS ARE REWRITING THE RULES OF
WORK 140–41 (2018) [hereinafter ROSENBLAT, UBERLAND]; Luyao Li et al., Databook:
Turning Big Data Into Knowledge With Metadata at Uber, UBER ENGINEERING (Aug. 3,
2018), https://eng.uber.com/databook/.
37. Li, supra note 36.
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concludes with an analysis of the ways that Uber disavows control over
drivers’ work, and, at the same time exercises control in ways that
employment law does not recognize. The imagery of drivers as
independent, entrepreneurial, profit-seeking businesses successfully
masks the extent to which Uber controls the market that drivers operate in,
and how much of an eco-system the rideshare business model has become.
A. The Employee/Independent Contractor Distinction in Employment
and Labor Law
Federal, state, and local governments limit their regulatory
protection to “employees.” The employment and labor law schemes
assume that because independent contractors play a different role than
employees in the market, their exclusion from employment protections is
consistent with legislative purpose.38 The threshold question in
employment regulation is thus whether the relationship between the
worker (service provider) and the recipient of the worker’s services is an
“employment” relationship.
Federal employment statutes contain broad and/or circular
definitions of the term “employee.” The Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), for example, defines an employee as “any individual employed
by an employer.”39 The FLSA defines the term “employ” as “to suffer or
permit to work.”40 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which
governs private collective bargaining, states only whom the term
“employee” does not include:
any employee . . . , but shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as
a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the
Railway Labor Act, . . . or by any other person who is not an employer as
herein defined.41

The statute also fails to define “employer,” stating only that it
includes an employer’s agent and does not include governments, the

38. See Hiroshi Motomura, Employees and Independent Contractors Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 2 INDUS. RELS. L. J. 278, 279 (1977).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2018).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2018).
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Federal Reserve Bank, or railroads.42 While each Act excludes
independent contractors, it is difficult in practice to determine whether a
worker is an employee. Courts, legal scholars, policy makers, and
advocates have debated endlessly over whether workers, including
rideshare drivers, are properly classified as independent contractors.43
Drawing this distinction is also difficult because each employment
and labor law statute requires its own scrutiny. Courts have developed
multi-factor tests to determine whether a worker is an employee at
common law, or under a specific labor or employment statute. None of
the tests are outcome determinative; rather, courts use the factors to
measure the contours of the relationship.
The common-law, or right-to-control, test for employee status
derives from the law of “master and servant” in the law of agency,44
originally formulated to determine a principal’s vicarious liability for the
torts of its agents.45 According to the Restatement of Agency, the
following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
thedetails of the work;

42. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2018).
43. See, e.g., Noah Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor
Problem Without RedefiningEmployment, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 280–82 (2011);
Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy and the Future of Employment and Labor Law, 51 UNIV. S.F.
L. REV. 51, 68–69 (2017); Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, The Problem of “Misclassification” or
How to Define Who is an “Employee” Under Protective Legislation in the Information Age,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF U.S. LAB. L. FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 140
(Richard Bales & Charlotte Garden eds., 2019); Deepa Das Acevedo, Unbundling Freedom
in the Sharing Economy, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 799–80 (2018); Richard R. Carlson, Why
the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When it Sees One and How it Ought to Stop Trying, 22
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 296 (2001); Catherine Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 380 (2008); Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical
Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without
Employers, 27 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 251, 281 (2006); Jeffrey Hirsch, Employee or
Entrepreneur, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 355 (2011); Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or
Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 65, 68
(2017); Veena Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of
Misclassification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739, 795–96
(2017) [hereinafter Dubal, Winning the Battle].
44. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958) in defining employee status).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958). The definition of
“servant” in the Restatement of Agency appears in Chapter 7, “Liability of Principal to Third.
Person; Torts,” under Title B, “Torts of Servants.”
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(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work
is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master
and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.46

Employee status is “‘based on the employer’s right or power to
exercise control over the method and means of performing the work and
not merely the exercise of actual control.’”47 Whether a worker is an
employee or independent contractor under this test is a mixed question
of law and fact that “should typically be determined by a jury, and not
the judge.”48 “[N]o fixed rule” is appropriate and “no single phase of the
evidence is determinative;” the result “depends in each case upon its
particular facts taken as a whole.”49 Courts use the common-law test to
determine whether a worker is an employee under state statutes, as well
as under federal statutes such as the National Labor Relations Act,
ERISA, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.50
The economic realities test, which the Department of Labor and
courts use to interpret the Fair Labor Standards Act, seeks to establish
whether an employee is economically reliant on an employer for her

46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. L. INST. 1958).
47. Narayanasamy v. Issa, 435 F. Supp. 3d 388, 391 (D.R.I., January 16, 2020) (citing
Rhode Island common law in a case involving Uber drivers).
48. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cotter v. Lyft,
60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing California common law); accord
Narayanasamy, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 392 (citing Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1076).
49. Narayanasamy, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 390.
50. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120 (1944); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992); Supershuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. 75
(2019); EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2019); Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444 (2003).
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livelihood. As the Department of Labor notes, “The employer-employee
relationship under the FLSA is tested by “economic reality” rather than
“technical concepts.”51 The Supreme Court has noted that factors in
determining whether an employment relationship exists under the
economic realities test include the extent to which the services provided
are an integral part of the business; the permanency of the relationship;
the level of the worker’s investment in facilities and equipment; the
nature and degree of the employer’s control over the work; the worker’s
opportunities for profit and loss; the amount of judgment, foresight and
initiative required for success in the market; and the degree to which the
worker maintains an independent business or organization.52 While the
economic realities test is broader than the common-law right-to-control
test,53 courts have conflated it with the right-to-control test. Courts have
more recently imposed yet another test, a riff on the right-to-control test,
which emphasizes entrepreneurial opportunities as another factor in
evaluating the independence of workers.54 None of the tests are outcomedeterminative, and courts make fact-specific inquiries to determine
employment status every time such a case arises.
1. The Right-to-Control Test and State Employment Law
In Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., Federal
Express drivers claimed they had been misclassified as independent
contractors and made wage claims under state employment law.55
Presaging the current arguments made by rideshare companies, FedEx
claimed it was primarily a logistics company and did not employ
drivers.56 Rather, FedEx asserted that the drivers owned and maintained
their own vehicles while setting their own routes and schedules.57
Multiple class-action lawsuits were filed, and courts throughout the
country weighed in on the drivers’ status; after the cases were centralized,

51. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Fact Sheet 12: Employment Relationship Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (2008), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs13
.pdf.
52. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716–19 (1947); Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131.
53. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 503 U.S. at 326.
54. See Matthew Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 661, 682 (2013).
55. 765 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2014).
56. Id. at 989.
57. Id. at 990.
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the judge in charge of the multi-district litigation certified 26 class
actions.58
Using the common-law right-to-control test to measure the work
relationship, the Ninth Circuit held that the FedEx drivers were
employees.59 The drivers had filed a statewide class action suit in
California seeking overtime and back wages under the California Labor
Code.60 FedEx removed the case to federal court, which had to decide
whether the drivers were employees.61 Cases in over forty states were
similarly filed across the country, and all the cases were consolidated into
multi-district litigation in the Northern District of Indiana.62 The MDL
court certified a class on the wage claims under California law, and held
that the plaintiffs were independent contractors as a matter of law in all
states, including California, that used the common-law right-to-control test
to determine employee status.63 The plaintiffs appealed the MDL ruling
to the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the district court’s decision on
employment status.64 The Ninth Circuit held that the FedEx drivers were
employees as a matter of law, under California’s version of the right-tocontrol test.65 The MDL judge later acknowledged that although the
drivers all had the same contract, administering the MDL was
complicated by differences in agency law among the states.66
Nonetheless, as the judge noted, “rulings in other courts were trending
toward findings of employee status” for the FedEx drivers.67
The Ninth Circuit gave little weight to the entrepreneurial
opportunities available to drivers, who owned the FedEx vehicles and
could hire substitute drivers. Instead, the court noted the extent to which
FedEx controlled the details of the drivers’ activities, from their dress and
appearance, to the specifications over the appearance of the drivers’

58. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 2017 WL 2672767 at *1 (N.D. Ind.).
59. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 988.
60. Id. at 987.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 988. The California common-law test is articulated in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc.
v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).
66. In re Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc., 2017 WL 2672767 at *1 (N.D. Ind.).
67. Id. at *2.
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vehicles, to the general routes Fedex assigned the drivers.68 The rest of the
factors—the right to terminate at will; whether packagedelivery is distinct
from the company’s business; whether the work is performed under
FedEx’s direction; the skill required for the job; who owns the tools and
equipment; the length of the servicecontracts; whether the work is part of
FedEx’s regular business; and the parties’ perceptions of the
relationship—either weighed in favor of drivers as employees, or did not
carry enough weight to overcome the level of control FedEx wielded over
the specifics of package delivery.69
Ultimately, FedEx settled the claims of the California FedEx drivers.
FedEx agreed to pay drivers $226.5 million to resolve state and federal
law employment claims.70 FedEx subsequently restructured its contractor
agreements to conform to the factors that point to independent contractor
relationships.71 It continues to maintain fleets of trucks through
subcontracting arrangements with companies that themselves hire
drivers.72
The Ninth Circuit’s broad analysis of factors in Alexander contrasts
with the D.C. Circuit’s narrower approach to the control test in an earlier
case under the NLRA. When drivers formed a union to bargain
collectively with FedEx, the D.C. Circuit held that they were
independent contractors who lacked employees’ statutory right to
organize.73 The court asserted “while all the considerations at common
law remain in play,” its precedent had, at the “urging” of the NLRB,
“‘shift[ed the] emphasis’ away from the unwieldy control inquiry in favor
of a more accurate proxy:” whether the workers “have ‘significant
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.’”74 The court claimed this
shift was merely a “subtle refinement” of the right-to-control test that
“does not make applying the test purely mechanical,” while
acknowledging that it makes “line drawing . . . easier.”75 The court
highlighted several pieces of evidence that pointed to entrepreneurial

68. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 989–90.
69. Id. at 994–96.
70. In re FedEx, 2017 WL 2672767 at *6.
71. Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 43 at 790.
72. Id. at 791.
73. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
74. Id. at 498.
75. Id.
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potential. First, a provision in the FedEx operating agreement specified
that the drivers were not employees.76 Second, the operating agreement
specified that the drivers controlled the manner and means of doing
business, and they were not subject to FedEx rules or disciplinary
procedures.77 Third, the drivers owned their own vehicles, which they
could use for other commercial if they so chose.78 Fourth, drivers could
hire other drivers, or find their own replacements if they wanted to take
time off.79 Finally, they could sell, trade, exchange or dispose of their
routes without FedEx’s permission.80 The court found that while other
factors augured in favor of employee status, they did not outweigh the
factor pointing to significant entrepreneurial opportunity. The Ninth
Circuit in Alexander was dismissive of the D.C. Circuit’s approach,
stating that “even if correct,” the D.C. Circuit’s approach would apply
only under the NLRA and not under California agency or employment
law.81 The NLRB, however, has since taken the position that Uber drivers
are independent contractors under the D.C. Circuit’s “entrepreneurial
opportunity” approach.82 The FedEx cases demonstrate not only the
difficulty in determining whether workers are employees under labor and
employment laws, but they also demonstrate some of the weaknesses of
the National Labor Relations Act in protecting collective activity in
the workplace. Legal scholars and others have long bemoaned the
growing ineffectiveness of the NLRA—as a result of anti-labor
interpretations—to protect workers in new work configurations and
emerging industries.83
FedEx’s response to its drivers’ claims was to restructure its future
contracts so that they reflected the company’s desire to establish
independent contractor relationships. Rideshare companies have done the

76. Id. at 498.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 498–499.
79. Id. at 499.
80. Id. at 500.
81. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 2014).
82. NLRB, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, Advice Memorandum (April 16, 2019),
https://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/files/2019/05/NLRB-Uber-memo.pdf
[hereinafter
NLRB, Advice Memorandum].
83. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2002); Benjamin Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2685, 2694–95 (2008).
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same thing, reflecting in their contracts their intention to create
independent contractor relationships with their drivers. As we describe
below, they have also taken one step further. They have turned to the
legislative arena to ensure that their drivers are considered independent
contractors for purposes of employment laws, including workers’
compensation, wage and hour laws, and unemployment compensation.
The role of the common-law factors is still an important one at the
legislative level. The factors have become something of a checklist for
rideshare employers who want to side-step employment law rules and
regulations.
2. Driver Treatment under the Economic Realities Test
The employee-independent contractor distinction for drivers has
undergone similar analyses under the economic realities test of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. In Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., for example,
the Second Circuit held that drivers were independent contractors for
purposes of the FLSA, upholding the district court’s summary judgement
in favor of the car service company.84 In that case, drivers for a black car
limousine service in New York City sued under state wage laws and the
Fair Labor Standards Act.85 The circuit court focused on determining
whether, as an economic reality, the drivers “depend on someone else’s
business for the opportunity to render service or are in business for
themselves.”86 The court applied the economic realities test and its
factors, as a guide to determine the economic reality of the arrangement
between the drivers and the car service company. The court held that the
drivers were, in fact, in business for themselves after considering the
factors. The court found that the drivers determined the manner and
extent of their business dealings with the company; decided whether to
work for the company exclusively, for rivals, or for themselves; decided
the extent to which they would invest in their driving businesses; and
determined when and how to provide rides for the company’s clients.87
The drivers, were, therefore held to be independent contractors as a matter
of law.88

84. Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2017).
85. Id. at 138.
86. Id. at 139.
87. Id. at 140.
88. Id.
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3. The Labor-Antitrust Nexus
The employee-independent contractor distinction further affects
worker rights in that independent contractors who engage in collective
labor action may run afoul of antitrust law. Section 1 of The Sherman
Act, the primary U.S. antitrust statute, prohibits “every contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” in interstate or
foreign commerce.89 A Section 1 violation has two basic elements:
concerted action (a “contract, combination or conspiracy”) and
anticompetitive effect (unreasonable “restraint of trade”). Section 1, like
the rest of the Act, is short on detail, leaving its specifics to courts and
the Act’s enforcement agencies, the Federal Trade Commission and
Department of Justice. As the Supreme Court has observed, courts act
more like “common-law courts” with respect to antitrust law than in other
statutory areas.90 According to the Court, “Just as the common law adapts
to modern understanding and greater experience, so too does the Sherman
Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ evolve to meet the dynamics
of present economic conditions.”91
Collective labor action can constitute concerted action in restraint of
trade, the NLRA’s guarantees notwithstanding. Indeed, although the
Sherman Act was passed to fight the power of interstate corporate
empires, the government brought more Section 1 actions against unions
in the Act’s early years.92 The Supreme Court held in 1908 that labor
unions are subject to the Sherman Act, noting that Congress had tried
and failed to include an explicit labor exemption.93 In response, Congress
passed Section 6 of the Clayton Act in 1914 to permit unions under the
antitrust laws.94 It states:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor . . . organizations . . .; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.95

89. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
90. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981).
91. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
92. Lao, supra note 16, at 1560.
93. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2018).
95. Id.
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The Supreme Court originally interpreted this exemption very
narrowly.96 Following the passageof the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
NLRA, however, it eventually came to recognize a broader judicial
exemption for organized labor activity. According to the Court, “labor
policy favor[s] the association of employees to eliminate competition
over wages and working conditions” and thus the exemption tolerates the
anticompetitive effects (and only those effects) that “follow naturally
from the elimination of [such] competition.”).97 The Court has expressly
held, however, that the exemption does not apply to collective action by
non-employees.98 In another influential case, the Court did not even
mention the exemption in holding that independent contractors’
concerted refusal to work constituted an illegal price-fixing agreement, a
so-called “per se” violation of the Sherman Act Section 1.99
B. Judicial, Legislative and Administrative Treatment of Rideshare
Drivers
If rideshare drivers are independent contractors, they not only lack
the protection of employment laws, but also run the risk of anti-trust
violations if they organize to bargain collectively with rideshare
companies.100 Because the stakes are so high, rideshare drivers have filed
multiple lawsuits claiming employee status under wage and hour laws

96. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (U.S. 1921)(prohibiting
unions to boycott nonunion employers for the purpose of pressuring them to permit
unionization, a so-called “secondary boycott”). Congress later explicitly protected secondary
boycotts in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
97. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 622, 625 (1975).
98. See Columbia River Packers’ Assoc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145 (1942); L.A. Meat
& Provision Drivers’ Union, Loc. 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 101 (1962).
99. See FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 (1990). In that case, a
group of private defense lawyers refused to continue taking court-appointed cases unless the
court increased their compensation. Id. The “per se” doctrine is discussed infra Part III.A.
100. Columbia River Packers, 315 U.S. at 145–47 (holding that fishermen’s attempts to
unionize violated antitrust law because fishermen were independent businesses attempting to
control the price of commodities); Local 626, 371 U.S. at 98 (holding that middlemen who
sold restaurant grease to processors could not engage in collective activity without violating
antitrust law); see also Lao, supra note 16, at 1561–62; Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring
Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. L.J. 969, 970–71
(2016); Sanjukta Paul, Uber as a For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and its
Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 234–35 (2017).
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and the NLRA.101 Some state and local laws have classified drivers as
employees, while others have classified them as independent
contractors.102 The latter statutes, sponsored by the rideshare industry,
have replaced the flexible common-law right-to-control test with a
mechanical checklist approach tailored to rideshare drivers’ contracts.
Although the federal courts have not issued a definitive ruling, the NLRB
has taken the position that drivers are independent contractors for NLRA
purposes.103 This Part examines these and other developments in the legal
treatment of rideshare drivers.
1. Litigation
Two prominent cases involved Uber drivers’ status under labor and
employment law. Recently, drivers in California sued Uber for wage and
other violations of the California Labor Code.104 The parties settled early
in 2019.105 As part of the settlement agreement, Uber agreed to driver
panels that would review Uber decisions regarding termination or
deactivation of drivers. Although not anywhere near the protection of a
formal labor organization, the settlement’s terms did introduce principles
of due process and fairness to an otherwise opaque decision-making
process about drivers’ continued access to the customers.
A second case, still in litigation, has raised (but not yet answered)
the question of whether collective bargaining by drivers violates antitrust
law. In 2015, the City of Seattle passed an ordinance permitting rideshare
drivers to bargain collectively. The ordinance allowed rideshare workers
to establish collective agreements with rideshare companies, and
regulated the topics that could be negotiated.106 The Chamber of
Commerce sued the city, challenging the ordinance on both Sherman Act
and NLRA grounds.107 According to the Chamber, the Sherman Act
preempted the ordinance because it would facilitate price-fixing among

101. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cotter
v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
102. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
103. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
104. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135; Verhines v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. CGC-20583684, complaint filed, 2020 WL 1187253 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. Cty. Mar. 12, 2020).
105. Uber Settlement Agreement at ¶ 127(b), 3:13-cv-03826-EMC (N.D. CA, 2019).
106. See SEATTLE WASH. MUN. CODE § 6.310.735 (H)(2) (2020).
107. Chamber of Com. v. City of Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 2017).

2021]

RIDESHARE DRIVERS

825

drivers in violation of Section 1.108 The city invoked the so-called Parker
doctrine, under which Sherman Act immunity extends to anticompetitive
action by private actors (such as the drivers) “carrying out the State’s
regulatory program.”109 The district court agreed that the ordinance was
within the Parker doctrine’sprotection110 and was not preempted by the
NLRA.111
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion did not determine whether collective
bargaining by drivers would violate the Sherman Act or whether drivers
are protected employees under the NLRA.112 It did make some potentially
important pronouncements, however. In an apparent victory for drivers,
it held that states have the authority to authorize labor organizing by
independent contractors.113 In an apparent victory for rideshare apps, the
court endorsed the argument that the apps operate a business distinct from
the provision of transportation services.114 The court held that the NLRA
did not preempt the ordinance because the Chamber had failed to
establish that the drivers are employees.115 According to the court, the
NLRA preempts only state and local laws governing labor organizing by
employees; the states remain free to legislate with respect to independent
contractors.116
Even though the ordinance is proper under the NLRA, the collective
action of drivers would still be subject to the Sherman Act. The court held
that the ordinance did not trigger immunity under Parker.117 The
immunity applies only when private actors are carrying out a “clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state policy.”118 The court
reasoned that the collective bargaining by drivers did not carry out such
108. Id. at 1162.
109. Id. at 1162–62; see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
110. City of Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1160–63, 1169.
111. Id. at 1171–74.
112. Chamber of Com. v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018).
113. Id. at 791 (“The Chamber argues that Congress’s choice to exclude independent
contractors from the NLRA’s definition of ‘employee’ in 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) implicitly
preempts local labor regulation of independent contractors. We disagree.”).
114. Id. at 785 (“[T]here is a critical distinction between transportation services by forhire drivers and ride-referral services by companies like Uber and Lyft.”).
115. Id. at 790–95.
116. Id. at 794-95.
117. Id. at 781–87.
118. Id. at 782.
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a policy because the ordinance focused on “the provision of privately
operated for hire transportation services, not the contractual payment
arrangements between for-hire drivers and driver coordinators for use
of the latter’s smartphone apps.”119 The Ninth Circuit did not reach the
question of whether the drivers’ collective action under the ordinance
would violate the Sherman Act. It remanded the case for the district court
to determine whether it would be a per se violation of Section 1 or
whether it should be reviewed under the more flexible rule of reason.120
The case is still in litigation.
2. State Legislative Developments
Not satisfied with the uncertainty in the courts’ application of the
employment and labor tests, rideshare companies have lobbied state
legislatures to restrict the definition of “employee” for rideshare drivers.
Uber and other rideshare companies drafted model legislation for
“transportation network companies” (TNC) that would apply to rideshare
platforms,121 and have supported more general “marketplace contractor”
(MC) laws that would apply to online platform providers.122 Both forms
of model legislation would create carve-outs from employment protection
for rideshare drivers and other platform workers.123 The TNC and MC
model legislation would create their own tests for exemption from labor
standards.124 Each of the statutory “test” factors would mirror the current

119. Id. at 784.
120. Id. at 795. The per se rule and rule of reason are discussed infra Part III.
121. Id. at 4; see also Gali Racabi, Despite the Binary: Looking for Power Outside the
Employee Status, TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Racabi, Despite the Binary];
GALI RACABI, TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES (TNC) AND MARKETPLACE
CONTRACTORS (MC) STATE LAWS: PREEMPTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS AND
TREATMENT OF EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DRIVERS (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3269522; Owain James, Uber and Lyft are Lobbying States to Prohibit
Local Regulation, MOBILITY LAB (July 24, 2018), https://mobilitylab.org/2018/07/24/uber-andlyft-are-lobbying-states-to-prohibit-local-regulation/; Commercial Ride Sharing, T HE N AT ’ L
A SSOC . OF I NS . C OMM ’ RS (Mar. 4, 2020), https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic
_commercial_ride_sharing.htm (“A TNC is an organization offering prearranged
transportation services for compensation using an online application or platform to connect
passengerswith drivers willing to transport them.”).
122. See Rebecca Smith, ‘Marketplace Platforms’ and ‘Employers’ Under State Law—
Why We Should Reject Corporate Solutions and Support Worker Led Innovations, NAT’L
EMP. L. PROJECT (May 18, 2018), https://www.nelp.org/publication/marketplace-platformsemployers-state-law-reject-corporate-solutions-support-worker-led-innovation/.
123. Id.
124. An example of such legislation is Florida’s MC statute. See FLA. STAT. § 451.02
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business model of the platform companies and would ignore major factors
of the right-to-control test, including freedom from company control,
provision of services outside the scope of the company’s work, and
operating a separate business.125
Interestingly, the conservative lobbying group ALEC
promoted the model TNC and MC legislation to states as early as
2014.126 In less than ten years, ALEC and the rideshare industry have
succeeded in passing legislation in 48 states.127 Uber even drafted bills that
became law in Oregon, Ohio, Texas and Washington.128 States like North
Carolina, Arkansas, Indiana, Oregon, Washington, Texas and Florida
have all modified the definition of employee at the behest of rideshare
companies.129
The most common statutory provisions declare that rideshare
companies do not control rideshare drivers.130 In these states, courts still
use the right-to-control or similar tests, but the legislation establishes a
rebuttable presumption that rideshare drivers are independent
contractors.131 In Utah, rideshare drivers are defined as independent

(2020).
125. Rebecca Smith, supra note 122.
126. See Rebecca Smith et al., Uber State Interference: How TNC’s Buy, Bully and
Bamboozle Their Way to Deregulation, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Jan 18, 2018),
https://www.nelp.org/publication/uber-state-interference/ [hereinafter, NELP Report].
127. Id.
128. Id. at 20.
129. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-280.8 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-13-719 (2020); IND.
CODE § 22-1-6-3 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 451.02 (2020); see also, Racabi, Despite the Binary,
supra note 121.
130. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40.1-1.07 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-10.1-602 (2014);
IDAHO CODE § 49-3703 (2015); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57/5 (2021); IND. CODE § 8-2.1-19.1-4
(2015); IOWA CODE § 321N.1 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2702 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 69-12-101 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 75-302 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 706A.090 (2015);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-7-2(2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 1011 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
32-40-1 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-15-302 (2015); WIS. STAT. § 440.41 (2020); see also
Racabi, Despite the Binary, supra note 121.
131. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-13-719 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 451.02 (2018); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 23-1603 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 2, § 1911 (2016); ALASKA STAT. § 28.23.080
(2017); KY. REV. STAT. § 336.137 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.2137 (2016); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 77-8-21 (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376-A:20 (2018); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §
2402.114 (West 2017); W. VA. CODE § 17-29-11 (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN.. § 31-20-110
(2017).
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contractors for all employment-law purposes, full stop.132
Some statutes modify the right-to-control test by creating checklists
of conditions sufficient to establish an independent contractor
relationship, abandoning common law agency’s flexible, context-specific
approach, including a narrow emphasis on “entrepreneurial
opportunities.”133 These statutes condition independent contractor status
on contractual provisions that specify the amount of control the rideshare
company can have.134 One of the factors in the right-to-control test is the
parties’ mutual understanding: whether they “believe” they are forming
an employment relationship.135 Although no factor takes precedence
under the common-law approach, contractual intent has outsized
significance in state legislative definitions of independent contractor
status for drivers.
Indiana’s statute displays all these characteristics. Independent
contractor status is established when the worker has a written contract
with the platform containing all the following provisions:
(A) The marketplace contractor is providing services as an independent
contractor and notas an employee of the marketplace platform.
(B) All or substantially all of the payments paid to the marketplace contractor
are to be based on the performance of services or other output by the
marketplace contractor.
(C) The marketplace contractor may work any hours or schedules the
marketplace contractor chooses. However, if the marketplace contractor does
elect to work specified hours or schedules, the marketplace platform may
require the marketplace contractor to work during the specified hours or
schedules that the marketplace contractor elected to work.
(D) Except as provided in clause (C), the marketplace contractor may perform
services forother parties without restriction.
(E) The marketplace contractor bears responsibility for all or substantially all
of the expenses that the marketplace contractor pays or incurs in performing the
services, without the right to obtain reimbursement from the marketplace
platform for the expenses.136

Florida’s statute, similar to Indiana’s, goes so far as to cover drivers

132. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-51-103 (West 2019).
133. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
134. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-13-719 (2015); IND. CODE. § 22-1-6-3 (2018).
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(i) (AM. L. INST. 1958).
136. IND. CODE § 22-1-6-3(3) (2018).

2021]

RIDESHARE DRIVERS

829

retroactively.137
Despite the rideshare companies’ best efforts, the definition of
employment continues to be highly contested state by state. In California,
for example, the legislature codified a case setting out a worker-friendly
test for determining who is a protected employee for state wage and hour
purposes. In 2018, the California Supreme Court held that all workers
were presumed employees under California wage and hour laws unless an
employer could prove they were independent contractorsunder a newly
formulated “ABC” test.138 The test replaced the California’s version of
the right-to-control test for wage and hour cases. Under the ABC test, a
worker is presumed to be an employee for purposes of wage and hour
regulations unless the employer proves:
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity
in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for
the performance of the work and in fact;
(B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring
entity’s business; and
(C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed.139

The California legislature quickly codified the ABC test in
Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5), extending beyond the wage and hour setting to a
broad array of protections under the Labor Code.140 Notably, although the
law lists explicit exemptions for various types of workers, including
lawyers and hairdressers, the list does not include rideshare drivers.
Rideshare firms are unlikely to be able to satisfy the ABC test. Unlike the
state statutes described above, this test gives no legal weight to
contractual provisions purporting to establish independent contractor
status.
This overview of state activity demonstrates two things. First,
employment status is highly contested, and as the battles have moved
from the courts to the legislature, the rideshare companies continue to
contest driver status. In California specifically, Uber and Lyft joined
forces to place Proposition 22, a voter initiative, on the November 2020

137. FLA. STAT. § 451.02(2) (2018).
138. Dynamex Operations v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35–36 (Cal. 2018).
139. Id. at 36–41.
140. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West 2017) (amended 2020); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3
(repealed 2020).
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ballot that would define drivers as independent contractors.141 The voter
initiative would direct the legislature to define rideshare and delivery
drivers as independent contractors, essentially creating a rideshare
exception to AB 5.142 The rideshare companies succeeded in getting the
voter initiative passed. This paves the way for a rewrite of the law at a
statewide level, robbing both localities and courts of the power to decide
whether drivers are employees. As a result, the rideshare companies could
avoid current minimum-wage, sexual harassment and antidiscrimination
laws, unemployment and workers’ compensation systems, and efforts (like
Seattle’s) to permit collective bargaining at the local level.143
Second, many state legislatures, influenced by rideshare lobbyists,
have supplanted the common-law definition of employment, making it
easier for rideshare companies to show their drivers are independent
contractors. In those states, Uber and Lyft need only craft their contracts
to meet the statutory checklists. Wherever these statutes proliferate,
employment law as we know it—along with its common-law nature—
will become irrelevant to the discussion.
3. Administrative Developments
In April 2019, the Trump Administration’s National Labor Relations
Board and Department of Labor issued similar memoranda declaring that
rideshare drivers were independent contractors.

141. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7451 (West 2020) (having passed by voter initiative,
it was previously known as California Proposition 22, App Based Drivers as Contractors and
Labor Policies Initiative). The initiative overrides AB5 on the question of whether drivers are
employees. It also enacts wage policies specifically for rideshare drivers, including an
earnings floor; a maximum number of work hours per day; healthcaresubsidies; occupational
accident insurance; accidental death insurance; and requires companies to develop antidiscrimination and sexual harassment policies. See also Hannah Wiley, Uber, Lyft and
DoorDash Seeking Labor Law Exemption Heads to California Voters, SACRAMENTO BEE
(May 22, 2020, 6:12 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitolalert/article242948676.html.
142. California Proposition 22, App-Based Drivers as Independent Contractors and Labor
Policies Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_22
,_App-Based_Drivers_as_Contractors_and_Labor_Policies_Initiative_(2020).
143. NELP Report, supra note 126, at 13, 32, 24–26. The battle in California is not over,
however. A lawsuit is making its way through the courts which challenges the
constitutionality of Proposition 22 because it limits legislative authority. See Altshuler Berzon
LLP, Service Employees International Union, Drivers, and Consumer File Constitutional
Challenge to Proposition 22 (Feb. 12, 2021), https://altshulerberzon.com/2021/02/12/serviceemployees-international-union-drivers-and-consumer-file-constitutional-challenge-toproposition-22-in-california-supreme-court/.
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The NLRB issued an advice memorandum concluding that Uber
drivers are independent contractors.144 It directed its regional offices to
dismiss unfair labor practice charges against Uber filed by rideshare
drivers.145 The NLRB invoked the common-law right-to-control test, but
incorporated the “subtle refinement” from the D.C. Circuit’s FedEx
opinion. It invoked the entrepreneurial opportunities test, announcing that
“where the common-law factors, considered together, demonstrate that
the workers in question are afforded significant entrepreneurial
opportunity, [the Board] will likely find independent-contractor status.”146
The Board underscored a driver’s ability to maximize entrepreneurial
opportunities due to flexible arrangements with the company, including
time on the job.147 The Board also noted two additional factors: (1) the
extent of the company’s control over the manner and means by which
drivers conduct business and (2) the relationship between the company’s
compensation and the amount of fares collected.148 All these factors are
present in the industry-sponsored state independent-contractor legislation
discussed above.
Similarly, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued an opinion letter149
regarding workers in platform businesses in general, including rideshare
workers. The DOL applied each of the economic reality factors to the
virtual platform environment, noting that a platform business doesnot
“receive services from service providers, but empowers service providers
to provide services to end-market consumers.”150 The DOL found that
platform workers were not economically dependent on specific platform
companies; that companies provided significant flexibility to workers to
provide services to competing companies, or to pursue economic
opportunities; that the relationship between a platform company and its
workers was not a permanent relationship but rather a project-based
relationship; that the company did not invest in the equipment, materials
orfacilities needed to provide the service; that workers did not rely on the
company for training or skills transfer; and that the workers maintained

144. See NLRB, Advice Memorandum, supra note 82.
145. Id. at 1.
146. Id. at 4 (quoting Supershuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. 75 at *1 (2019)).
147. Id. at 3–9.
148. Id. at 4.
149. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., FLSA 2019-6, Opinion Letter (Apr. 29,
2019).
150. Id. at 7.
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control over their profits and losses; and that the business of providing a
platform for the service and the business of providing the service itself
were different.151 Upon a review of all the factors, the DOL determined
that platform workers were independent contractors.
C. Rideshare Firms’ Hidden Control of Drivers: Employment
Relationship or Undue Market Power
Debates about whether drivers are employees notwithstanding,
rideshare companies do exert considerable power over drivers. Rideshare
firms draft contracts that are tailored to satisfy the checklists in the
industry-sponsored state statutes and also attempt to satisfy the right-tocontrol, economic realities or entrepreneurial opportunities tests, should
they still apply. At the same time, contract provisions empower the firms
to exert significant control over drivers in many subtle and complex ways
that may survive common-law scrutiny. These agreements include
payment structure; vehicle lease terms; rules governing drivers’ conduct
and the time they spend on the job; restrictions on driver grievances; as
well as non-disclosure, non-solicitation, non-disparagement, and noncompete agreements. To the extent this level of control outside of an
employment relationship might be considered unprecedented or novel, it
is important to understand its contours.
1. Rideshare-Driver Contracts Disavow an Employment
Relationship
As noted above, rideshare firms have distanced themselves from their
drivers by describing themselves as platforms and not transportation
companies. One factor evidencing an employment relationship in the
right-to-control test is that the work performed by the worker is within the
scope of the employer’s business.152 This factor also appears in many of
the state statutes defining drivers as independent contractors. Uber denies
that it is engaged in “the business of providing transportation” and even
claims that “drivers’ work is outside the usual course of Uber’s business.”153
According to Uber’s Chief Legal Officer, “the usual course of Uber’s
business . . . is serving as a technology platform for several different types

151. Id. at 7–10.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2) (AM. L. INST. 1958).
153. Bensinger, supra note 7.
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of digital marketplaces.”154
Similarly, rideshare firms’ contracts with drivers repeatedly insist
that the driver is an independent contractor, not an employee. The
contracts emphasize the driver’s independence and “entrepreneurial
opportunities.” For example: Uber’s Platform Access Agreement tells
drivers, “We are not hiring or engaging you to provide any service; you
are engaging us to provide you access to our Platform.”155 The Agreement
continues at length:
The relationship between the parties is solely as independent business
enterprises, each of whom operates a separate and distinct business enterprise
that provides a service outside the usual course of business of the other. This
is not an employment agreement and you are not an employee. You confirm
the existence and nature of that contractual relationship each time you access
our Platform. Nothing in this Agreement creates, will create, or is intended
to create, any employment, partnership, joint venture, franchise or sales
representative relationship between you and us.156

Lyft’s terms of service, applicable to both drivers and riders,
similarly disavow Lyft’s control over drivers:
It is up to the Driver to decide whether or not to offer a ride to a Rider
contacted through the Lyft Platform, and it is up to the Rider to decide whether
or not to accept a ride from any Driver contacted through the Lyft Platform.
We cannot ensure that a Driver or Rider will complete an arranged
transportation service. We have no control over the quality or safety of the

transportation that occurs as a result of the Rideshare Services.157

The Uber driver agreement further asserts that while Uber serves
both drivers and riders, Uber is not a party to the driver-rider relationship:
Accepting a Ride request creates a direct business relationship between you and
your Rider in accordance with the terms of the transportation service the Rider
has requested through our Platform.

To minimize their economic relationships with the driver, rideshare
firms assert that the payment relationship is between the driver and the
rider. According to Uber’s agreement, “Uber enables you, through the

154. Id.
155. Uber, Platform Access Agreement § 1.1 (Jan. 6, 2020).
156. Id.
157. Lyft, Platform Access Agreement § 12 (Nov. 27, 2019).
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Driver App, to charge your Rider(s) a ‘Fare’ for each Ride.”158 Uber seeks
to make clear that it does not pay the driver for her driving services; to
the contrary, the driver earns the entire fare from the rider, and the driver
then remits to Uber a “Service Fee” for serving as a platform and
processing payments.159 Similarly, Lyft’s driver agreement states that
Lyft does not pay drivers, but merely collects and passes on riders’
payments to drivers.160
Uber further claims to lack control over the manner of work
performance, another factor in the right-to-control test.161 According to
its Agreement, “[y]ou will choose the most effective, efficient, and safe
manner to reach the destinations associated with a Ride. Any navigational
directions offered in the Driver App are offered for your convenience only;
you have no obligation to follow such navigational directions.”162 It
further states:
We do not, and have no right to, direct or control you. Subject to Platform
availability, you decide when, where and whether (a) you want to offer
P2PService facilitated by our Platform and (b) you want to accept, decline,
ignore or cancel a Ride . . . request. . . . [Y]ou are not required to accept any
minimum number of Rides. . . . and it is entirely your choice whether to
provide P2PService to Riders directly, using our Platform, or using any other
method to connect with Riders, including, but not limited to other platforms
and applications in addition to, or instead of, ours.163

Finally, in response to court opinions finding the use of a branded
uniform might indicate an employment relationship to customers,164 the
Uber driver agreement states that the use of the Uber brand name does not
make a driver an employee:
The parties expressly agree that your access to, or use of, Uber Branded
Materials, whether or not authorized, does not indicate an employment or
other similar relationship between you and us. You further agree not to

158. Uber, Fare Addendum 1 (Jan. 6, 2020).
159. Id.
160. Lyft, Driver Addendum § 3 (Aug. 26, 2019).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1958) (stating that
servant status depends on “the extent of controlwhich, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work”).
162. Uber, Platform Access Agreement, § 2.6(b) (Jan. 6, 2020).
163. Id. at § 1.2.
164. See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.
2014).
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represent yourself as our employee, representative or agent for any purpose or
otherwise misrepresent your relationship with us.165

2. The Contracts Give Rideshare Firms Subtle Control Over Drivers
a. Broad Aspects of Control
Despite these nominal expressions of driver independence, other
terms in the same contracts exert subtle forms of control over drivers that
the state statutes ignore and the common law may fail to take into
account. Most broadly, rideshare contracts with drivers are standard form
contracts that are non-negotiable and shift significant costs onto
drivers.166 Unlike true independent businesses, drivers have no ability to
bargain over their contracts. These adhesion contracts may be
unconscionable under state law. Many observers believe that rideshare
firms have imposed one-sided terms on drivers by taking advantage of
information asymmetries.167 Drivers’ gross pay appears artificially large
before calculating and subtracting costs such as vehicle costs,
depreciation and risk.168 Uber has also been accused of recruiting drivers
through deception by misrepresenting gross pay as net pay, fabricating
claims about high net pay, and by sponsoring questionable academic
research to support its PR narratives.169 Other accusations include baitand-switch tactics, such as offering incentives to recruit drivers and then
reducing compensation after drivers signed long-term vehicle-financing
contracts.170
Contractual control goes beyond the mere lack of informed
bargaining. Uber modifies its contracts with drivers often, changing the

165. Uber, Platform Access Agreement § 2.7(c) (Jan. 6, 2020); see FedEx Home Delivery
v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
166. See discussion supra Parts I, II.
167. See Horan, supra note 4, at 47 (citing Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Uber’s Drivers:
Information Asymmetries and Control in Dynamic Work, 10 INT’L L. J. COMM. 27 (2016))
[hereinafter Rosenblat & Stark, Information Asymmetries]. See also David Horton, The
Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 609
(2010) for a discussion on the ways that companies create information asymmetries with
customers through constant changes in contract terms that are difficult to keep up with.
168. Horan, supra note 4, at 47.
169. Id. at 47–9 (citing sources); Hubert Horan, Uber’s “Academic Research” Program:
How to UseFamous Economists to Spread Corporate Narratives, PROMARKET (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://promarket.org/ubers- academic-research-program-how-to-use-famous-economists-tospread-corporate-narratives/.
170. Horan, supra note 4, at 47–48.
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terms of service, commission structures, or prices, which drivers must
accept before logging on to the platform.171 This tactic further aggravates
information asymmetry because it is difficult for drivers to keep up with
these constant and unilateral contract changes.172
Rideshare firms’ contracts also control the conditions for exiting the
company, through arbitration, confidentiality and intellectual property
provisions, all of which appear in contracts of adhesion and mimic
provisions commonly found in employment agreements.173 Even in states
like California, where express noncompete contracts are
unenforceable,174 these provisions create a “contract thicket” preventing
drivers from leaving the company to compete with it.175 Both companies
have broad confidentiality provisions. Lyft’s prohibits use or disclosure
of “technical, financial, strategic and other proprietary and confidential
information relating to Lyft’s business, operations and properties,”176
while Uber’s specifically stakes a claim to all information the drivers
have produced during their history with the company and the platform,
which presumably includes driving patterns and routes, information about
riders and rides, operational information, technical information,
marketing information, etc.177
In the right-to-control test, the manner of payment is relevant to
determining the nature of the work relationship.178 A regular paycheck
dependent on a salary or hourly wage suggests an employer who has
control over an employee’s livelihood. On the other hand, payment based
on the amount of work suggests an independent contractor relationship.

171. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1630 (2017) [hereinafter Calo & Rosenblat, Taking].
172. Uber, Platform Access Agreement § 1.1 (Jan. 6, 2020).
173. See Lyft, Terms of Service §§ 11, (intellectual property), 17 (arbitration), 18
(confidentiality) (Nov. 27,2019); Uber, Platform Access Agreement §§ 8 (confidentiality), 9
(intellectual property), 13 (arbitration) (Jan. 6, 2020).
174. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2020).
175. Orly Lobel, The Contract Thicket: Addition and Supra Addition in Private Law
Theory, (forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors).
176. Lyft, Terms of Service § 18 (April 1, 2021).
177. Uber, Platform Access Agreement § 8.1 (Jan. 6, 2020).
178. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(g) (AM. L. INST. 1958) (stating
employment status is influenced by whether payment is determined “by the time or by the
job”).
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This factor is also an explicit checklist factor in many state statutes.179
Rideshare drivers resemble independent contractors under this criterion,
as they are paid according to the rides they give and not by the number of
hours they work.180
Under the rideshare business model, drivers cannot set their own
rates or compete with each other on the basis of price.181 As noted above,
the rates are set through adhesion contracts, and the net rate of pay is far
from transparent. Indeed, after a 2019 update of the Lyft app, drivers
complained that “they could no longer see how much the rider paid for
any given trip,” obscuring whether their payment is actually on a per-ride
basis.182
In addition, Uber can control when surge pricing is activated, and
individual drivers control only whether they participate. The price of a ride
surges according to the calculations of a proprietary algorithm during
high-demand periods. The company claims the algorithm spikes prices
when demand is high to encourage drivers to log on and accept
customers. There is little public information about the algorithm,
however. Uber claims that it operates independently of any company
interference, but this does not change the fact that Uber has unilaterally
selected the algorithm as the (non-transparent) method of determining
surge prices.
Uber also has the sole power to change its surge policies and has
done so often during its existence. Uber changed its surge policies
recently to allow drivers to earn surge pricing any time they drive through
a surge area, but reducing surge amounts for long trips. The new surge
pricing structure tells drivers how much more they will earn in dollar
amounts rather than as a function of the base price (e.g., 1.5x).183 This

179. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-1-6-3(3)(B) (2018).
180. Uber, Fare Addendum (Jan. 6, 2020) (driver is paid for each ride by “a base amount
plus amounts based on the Ride’s distance and/or time”); Lyft, Driver Addendum (Aug. 26,
2019) (driver’s payment for each ride “consists of a base fare or pickup fare amount plus
incremental amountsbased on the actual time and distance”).
181. See Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 819–20 (2016) (claiming that Uber’s
fare policies constituted price-fixing in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1). Although drivers are
permitted to charge less than the app’s prescribed fare, drivers have no way of communicating
that to a prospective rider, and it does not reduce the amount the driver must pay the app.
182. Sergio Avedian, Lyft Stops Showing Passenger Ride Details to Their Drivers,
RIDEGURU (Jan. 20, 2019),https://ride.guru/content/newsroom/lyft-stops-showing-passengerride-details-to-their-drivers.
183. Alex Rosenblat, The Truth About How Uber’s App Manages Drivers, HARV. BUS.

838

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

means that drivers know how much they will receive as a premium during
surge periods, but not how much Uber retains for these trips.
b. Control Over the Details of Work
The rideshare firms have considerable indirect control over how
drivers perform and how they conduct themselves on the job. As noted
above, Lyft has obscures from drivers on how much riders paid for each
trip even after the fact; this prevents drivers from choosing rides by
calculating which routes are most profitable.184 Drivers’ choice of rides is
further limited because they have no access to information about riders or
destinations until they accept their rides on the platform.185 Drivers do not
have viable options for declining rides once they accept and see this
information. They are penalized if they accept and subsequently decline
a ride, and face deactivation from the platform if they do so repeatedly.186
Uber’s control of this spatial aspect of a driver’s service demonstrates
how little choice drivers have in their individual rideshare decisions.
Uber has developed mechanisms based on behavioral economics to
direct drivers to needed locations. For example, at one point, Uber used heat
maps to show drivers where they could garner higher prices for rides,
without telling drivers exactly how much more they would make. The
color-coded maps indicated where prices were about to surge and where
they were surging, but they did not provide drivers with the exact surge
price available in the surge area.187 As one set of scholars noted, “These
constraints on drivers’ freedom to make fully informed and independent
choices reflect the broad information and power asymmetries that
characterize the relationship between Uber and its drivers and illustrate
how the Uber platform narrows the choices that drivers are free to
make.”188
Uber also directs drivers through its incentive pricing, which
REV. (April 6, 2016),https://hbr.org/2016/04/the-truth-about-how-ubers-app-manages-drivers
[hereinafter Rosenblat, Truth].
184. Avedian, supra note 185.
185. Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A
Case Study of Uber’s Drivers,10 INT’L J. COMM. 3758, 3762 (2016) [hereinafter Rosenblat &
Stark, Case Study].
186. Lyft, Terms of Service § 16 (Nov. 27, 2019); Rosenblat & Stark, Case Study, supra
note 185, at 3762.
187. PATRICK MCQUOWN ET AL., BROWN SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL ASPECTS OF UBER’S DRIVER-PARTNER PLATFORM 7–9 (2016).
188. Calo & Rosenblat, Taking, supra note 171, at 1662.
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changes frequently. For example, Uber has promised its drivers a
minimum hourly rate if they fulfill certain conditions, including
accepting ninety percent or more of the ride requested within the hour.189
Only Uber has the information about whether drivers have met the
conditions, however, and consequently, drivers do not know whether they
are owed the minimum hourly rates they are offered.190 In addition, Uber
changes its contractual obligations so often that it is impossible for drivers
to know the conditions of their work arrangements from day to day.191
In addition to directing where drivers go and which rides they accept,
rideshare firms indirectly control how drivers perform their work, including
which routes they take while driving.192 Despite claims that they do not
supervise drivers, Uber requires drivers to be tracked at all times.193
Moreover, rideshare companies have enlisted customers to “act as
managers” by helping the firms monitor driver performance and shape
their behavior.194 Drivers who do not meet rating thresholds may have
their accounts terminated.195 Since drivers are likely to be compared to
one another, the most reliable way to achieve high ratings is to “modify
their behavior to produce a fairly homogenous Uber experience” by
incorporating the firm’s “suggestions” for conduct, such as providing (at
the driver’s expense) bottled water and phone chargers, opening doors,
and taking the passenger’s preferred route.196
c. Control over Drivers’ Time
One of the factors courts use to determine employment status is the
amount of control the putative employer has over a worker’s time.197
189. See Rosenblat & Stark, Case Study, supra note 185, at 3764.
190. Id.
191. Calo & Rosenblat, Taking, supra note 171, at 1661.
192. ROSENBLAT, UBERLAND, supra note 36, at 133.
193. Brandon Bailey, Uber Using Software to Track Drivers’ Behavior, INS. J. (June 30,
2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016/06/30/418734.html; Lisa
Eadicicco, Uber Is Tracking Drivers’ Phones to Watch for Speeding (June 29, 2016),
https://time.com/4387031/uber-driver-app-tracking/.
194. Rosenblat, Truth, supra note 183.
195. Lyft, Terms of Service § 16 (Nov. 27, 2019); Uber, Community Guidelines (Apr. 22,
2020); Uber, Platform Agreement § 1.2 (Jan. 6, 2020).
196. Rosenblat, Truth, supra note 183.
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1958) (stating a
servant is one who renders “service in which the actor’s physical activities and his time are
surrendered to the control of the master”).
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Most of the states that have passed laws deeming drivers as independent
contractors contain provisions that prohibit the rideshare company from
unilaterally prescribing specific hours during which drivers must be
available to work.198 Uber professes that the beauty of its business model
is that drivers can decide when to drive and for how long. As an early Uber
investor put it, “no driver-partner is ever told where or when to work.”199
Drivers say they prize this flexibility, which they acknowledge is missing
in a traditional employer-employee relationship.
Despite this nominal freedom, Uber has developed subtle
mechanisms of control outside of formal contractual provisions that put
drivers on the road, keep them there, and discourage driver exit at the end
of a work period. Although the narrative of the Uber rideshare system is
that,“Uber has been able so far to build with an invisible hand a global
network able to “manage” bottom-up and with no such thing as a
“schedule,”200 the reality of control is quite different.
Uber uses behavioral science and even gaming technology to
incentivize drivers to get in their cars and stay there.201 Uber uses “choice
architecture,” or design elements meant to influence driver behavior by
designing how decisions are presented.202 It has used video gaming
technology, non-cash “prizes” and graphics to keep drivers working
longer and in less desirable locations.203 The company also uses
technology that sends a driver the next trip before the driver finishes a ride,
encouraging the driver to continue to work.204 These strategies capitalize
on drivers’ cognitive biases, such as loss aversion and availability bias,
which force drivers to underestimate low-probability events.205 As one
198. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-1-6-3(3) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 451.02(1)(a) (2018).
199. Gennaro Cuofano, How Does Uber Make Money? Uber Business Model in a
Nutshell, FourWeekMBA, https://fourweekmba.com/uber-business-model/ (quoting Bill
Gurley).
200. Id.
201. Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/
uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html.
202. Abbey Stemler et al., How Uber and Other Digital Platforms Could Trick Us Using
Behavioral Science- Unless We Act Fast, THE CONVERSATION (May 10, 2019, 6:38 AM),
https://theconversation.com/how-uber-and-other-digital-platforms-could-trick-ususingbehavioral-science-unless-we-act-fast-116722.
203. Scheiber, supra note 201.
204. Id.
205. Stemler et al., supra note 202; Rosenblat, Truth, supra note 183.
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observer noted, these tactics force drivers to act “like gamblers at a
casino, urged to play just a little longer despite the odds.”206
d. Control over Vehicles
According to another common-law factor, control over the tools,
instruments, or equipment used to perform work might indicate an
employment relationship.207 Rideshare firms do not supply the cars their
drivers use; this shifting of costs onto the driver is a critical part of the
rideshare business model.208 Nonetheless, rideshare firms retain indirect
control over drivers’ cars. A driver’s car must meet each firm’s minimum
specifications.209 For drivers who do not have a compliant car or prefer
not to use their personal car, the firms offer vehicle rental services that
afford the firms even greater control over the driver’s equipment.
Both Uber and Lyft formerly offered long-term car leases to drivers.
These long-term lease programs were criticized as “predatory” and
attracted regulatory scrutiny.210 According to one financial analyst, “The
lease terms [were] awful, you could buy the car for what they [were] being
leased for, or maybe even less.”211 Early on, Uber also offered a car
financing program that was tied to drivers’ logged hours. The cost of the
car was added to Uber’s commission on every ride logged in the app. As
one driver noted, the effect on drivers was coercive. “I just felt like I was
trapped, like I was an Uber slave.”212
The companies have since replaced their proprietary long-term lease
programs with Lyft ExpressDrive and Uber Vehicle Marketplace, shortterm rental programs with partners such as Hertz and Avis.213 Drivers
206. Stemler et al., supra note 202.
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(e) (AM. L. INST. 1958).
208. See discussion supra at Introduction.
209. See, e.g., Uber, Vehicle Requirement: San Francisco Bay Area,
https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/san-francisco/vehicle-requirements/; Lyft, What You Need
to Drive With Lyft in San Francisco, https://www.lyft.com/driver/cities/san-franciscoca/driver-application-requirements.
210. Sarah Skidmore Sell, Desperately Seeking Drivers, Uber and Lyft Offer Car Options,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 22, 2016), https://apnews.com/e0d97292395d4dbda2d1b8d
b17606a20/desperately-seeking-drivers-uber-and-lyft-offer-car-options.
211. Id.
212. Carla Green & Sam Levin, Homeless, Assaulted, Broke: Drivers Left Behind as Uber
Promises Changes at the Top, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jun/17/uber-drivers-homeless-assault-travis-kalanick.
213. See Uber Vehicle Marketplace, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/vehicle-
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using Lyft’s ExpressDrive rental cars are paid less and subject to “unique
restrictions,” such as a required minimum number of rides and a
prohibition on using the car to drive for other rideshare services.214 Lyft
claims that the lower pay rate reflects insurance costs, but its website
recruited drivers by telling them that insurance is “covered” by
ExpressDrive rental payments.215 Uber disclaims responsibility for its
Marketplace partners’ cars and, like Lyft, subjects them to pay
limitations:
Uber is not responsible for the products or services offered by other
companies, or for theterms and conditions (including financial terms) under
which those products and services are offered. Drivers renting with a rental
partner may qualify for trip surge areas and Uberpromotions specific to that
rental partner, but except as specified in the Driver app, may not qualify to
participate in other promotional offers.216

Moreover, the rideshare firm controls what rental car a driver may
use, as a driver’s options are limited to approved car rentals if they are
offered at all. As the Uber Marketplace website states, “Driving an
unapproved rental car may result in deactivation from the Uber
platform.”217 Uber has partnered with big brand car rental agencies Hertz
and Avis, which charge the same amount and do not seem to compete
with each other to offer deals to Uber drivers.218 Shorter-term rental
partners Getaround and Zipcar charge higher rates to rent for shorter
periods of time.219 As a major corporate partner, Uber earns money from
drivers who rent and potentially has some input into the terms offered by
the rental companies.
Thus, even though rideshare firms do not provide drivers’ vehicles,
they impose other forms of control over the equipment. Drivers who

solutions/ (last visited May 31, 2020).
214. Johana Bhuiyan, Lower Pay and Higher Costs: The Downside of Lyft’s Car Rental
Program, L.A. TIMES (May 20,2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tnlyft-express-drive-20190520-story.html.
215. Id.
216. Uber Vehicle Marketplace, supra note 213.
217. Id.
HERTZ,
218. Drive
to
Earn
with
Hertz,
Uber,
and
Lyft,
https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/misc/index.jsp?targetPage=rideshare_faq.jsp (last visited
May 31, 2020).
219. Uber Vehicle Marketplace, supra note 213.
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choose to use rented cars must rent from the rideshare company’s chosen
partner, accept a lower rate of pay, and forego driving for other rideshare
services.
***
While all these methods of control affect drivers’ livelihoods, they
are more subtle than those typically considered by common-law courts.
In any event, the common-law tests—already difficult to administer and
uncertain in their outcomes—are becoming less and less relevant as
legislatures modify employment definitions for rideshare drivers. Control
does not register at all in checklist statutes. Whether these mechanisms
of control rise to the level of employment under the right-to-control test
will eventually cease to matter in all but a few states if rideshare
companies have their way. As noted above, independent contractors who
lack employment law protections also face antitrust scrutiny if they
attempt to protect themselves through labor organizing. The next Part
discusses developments at the intersection of employment and antitrust
law that may open the door to organizing. The ultimate aim is for laws to
provide the leverage that rideshare drivers need to truly experience a
dignified market relationship with rideshare companies.
III. THE ANTITRUST OPPORTUNITY
A. Collective Bargaining, Price-Fixing and the Myth of the “Per Se
Rule”
Insofar as employment law protections are unavailable in many
states, collective bargaining might offer an alternative method of
addressing driver’s inferior bargaining power with respect to rideshare
firms. Although the NLRA does not protect labor organizing by nonemployees, it doesnot expressly prohibit it. Without the benefit of the
antitrust labor exemption, however, collective bargaining by rideshare
drivers would be open to scrutiny as a price-fixing agreement under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. This Article argues that it should survive
such scrutiny because drivers are an integral part of rideshare business
networks.
We begin with some background in antitrust law. According to the
Court, “the essential inquiry remains the same” in all antitrust cases
“whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.”220 The

220. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
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Court applies the “rule of reason,” a term that denotes not a “rule” but
ratherthe whole body of case law concerning whether an agreement has an
unreasonably anticompetitive effect.221 The Court has described the rule
of reason as “an inquiry into market power and market structure designed
to assess the combination’s actual effect.”222 A court determines that
effect by examining “the specifics of the challenged practices and their
impact upon the marketplace.”223 Proving anticompetitive effects
involves “analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the
restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.”224 The goal is to
“distinguis[h] between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are
harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in
the consumer’s best interest.”225 There is, however, no checklist or
formula for making this determination.
Certain types of agreements, such as price-fixing, are sometimes
said to be anticompetitive based on their “nature or character” and thus
“illegal per se.”226 The terminology is outdated and misleading, however,
insofar as it appears to state that some types of agreements are illegal as
a matter of law.227 In fact, the Court has expressly disavowed a categorical
approach and now expressly refuses to conclude that any business
conduct has anticompetitive effects based solely on its “nature.”228
Rather, the Court relies on its experience with certain kinds of conduct to
abbreviate the evidentiary inquiry required to show that an agreement is
unreasonably anticompetitive.229

221. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“Restraints that are not
unreasonable per se arejudged under the ‘rule of reason.’”).
222. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). “Market power”
refers to the ability to set prices without regard to the disciplining forces of supply and
demand, while “market structure” refers to the extent of concentration.
223. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 338 U.S. 365, 374 (1967), overruled by
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
224. See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
225. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)).
226. See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
227. See PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that
the so-called “per se rule”is separated from the context-specific “rule of reason” only by a
“vestigial line”).
228. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103; Broad. Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. (BMI), 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979).
229. See BMI, 441 U.S. at 23.
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Thus, even if an independent contractors’ agreement to bargain
collectively constitutes “price fixing,” whether such an agreement would
violate antitrust law is a fact-specific question, not a question of law.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that price-fixing
agreements among rivals are not categorically illegal: “When two
partners set the price of their goods or services they are literally ‘price
fixing’ but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act.”230 Courts
now state that conduct is declared illegal “per se” only if it’s likely
anticompetitive effects are well known to courts; this is knowledge
typically based on judicial experience with the type of conduct at issue
and the context in which it appears.231 By nature, such a conclusion is not
literally categorical: it requires some kind of context-specific inquiry into
the conduct’s effects, even if only indirectly by assessing its resemblance
to familiar conduct and contexts.232 Thus the so-called“per se” rule means
only that a reduced evidentiary inquiry is required when a case resembles
a situation with which courts have “considerable experience.”233 All
Section 1 cases involve the same “essential inquiry,” but fall along a
continuum with respect to the required evidentiary burden. The “per se
rule” simply describes the part of the continuum where the evidentiary
burden is at its lowest.234

230. Id. at 9; see also id. at 23 (“Not all arrangements among . . . competitors that have an
impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable restraints.”).
231. PolyGram Holding, 416 F.3d at 37 (“[T]he rebuttable presumption of illegality arises
not necessarily from anything ‘inherent’ in a business practice but from the close family
resemblance between the suspect practice and another practice that already stands convicted
in the court of consumer welfare.”); BMI, 441 U.S. at 2 (“It is only after considerable
experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations . .
. .”) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972))); BMI, 441
U.S. at 9 (“‘[P]rice fixing’ is a shorthand way of describing certain categories of business
behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable.”). While historical experience with
the anticompetitive effects of similar agreements is the typical basis for “per se” analysis, the
Court has stated in dicta that it is not necessarily required. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100 n.21
(refusing to apply per se analysis but stating that “while judicial inexperience with a particular
arrangement counselsagainst extending the reach of per se rules . . . the likelihood that
horizontal price and output restrictions are anticompetitive is generally sufficient to justify
application of the per se rule without inquiry into the special characteristics of a particular
industry.”).
232. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26 (“Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into
market conditions before theevidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct.”).
233. BMI, 441 U.S. at 23.
234. See PolyGram Holding, 416 F.3d at 35 (“[T]he Court . . . has backed away from any
reliance on fixed categories and toward a continuum . . .’our categories of analysis of
anticompetitive effects are less fixed than terms like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of
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The Court follows a simple procedural structure in applying the rule
of reason.235 An antitrust plaintiff bears the initial burden of making a
prima facie case, by showing that the challenged conduct has an adverse
effect on competition. A Section 1 plaintiff can make a prima facie case
using either direct or indirect evidence that the defendant’s concerted
conduct has anticompetitive effects. Direct evidence is that which directly
shows such an anticompetitive effect: an actual increase in price or
reduction in output. Indirect evidence is that which supports an inference
that the challenged conduct will have an anticompetitive effect. Indirect
evidence includes evidence that the defendant has market power (the
ability to set prices higher than the competitive market level) and
evidence that the conduct is anticompetitive in nature.236
If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant to rebut the prima facie case by showing that the
challenged conduct has “some countervailing procompetitive virtue—
such as, for example, the creation of efficiencies in the operation of a
market or the provision of goods and services.”237 This burden-shifting
structure illustrates an important substantive doctrinal point: even when
the plaintiff demonstrates that the challenged agreement has
anticompetitive effects, a court will also consider whether it has offsetting
procompetitive effects.
B.

“Business Deference”

In its move away from categorical analysis toward a more contextspecific one, Section 1 jurisprudence can be said to incorporate a
principle of “business deference.” Since the rise of neoclassical law-andeconomics in the 1970s, antitrust jurisprudence has become more
deferential to challenged business conduct, particularly when it appears
in purportedly novel business contexts. The Court extends greater
deference to business conduct when it perceives the effects to be less
reason” tend to make them appear.’” (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779
(1999))).
235. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (citing JULIAN O. VON
KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE Regulations § 12.02[2] (2d ed. 2017)).
236. Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 825 (6th Cir. 2011).
237. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); see also Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. at 2284 (“After the plaintiff satisfies its threshold burden of proof under the rule of
reason, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of the pro-competitive ‘redeeming
virtues’ of their combination.” (citing Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med.
Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993))).
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predictable. That predictability depends heavily on the law’s familiarity
with the relevant business context. Less familiar business contexts require
more factfinding and analysis.238 The novelty of the situation is relevant:
a court asks “whether the experience of the market has been so clear
. . . that a confident conclusion will follow from a quick (or at least
quicker) look . . . .”239 The more novel the business context, the more
detailed factual inquiry is required and the more procompetitive
justifications become relevant.240
This deference to business conduct is reminiscent of the “business
judgment rule” in state corporate law. Under that rule, shareholders have
no cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against a corporate director
or officer if the defendant acted in good faith in the interests of the
corporation—and, moreover, the court applies a very strong presumption
that all director and officer conduct is in good faith and in the interests of
the corporation.241 This deference has traditionally been explained with
the argument that “the judges are not business experts.”242 That reluctance
to judge business decisions is consistent with the antitrust principle that
courts should be cautious about condemning contracts unless “the
experience of the market has been . . . clear.”243
Business deference in antitrust law extends even to price-fixing
agreements, the archetype of a familiar anticompetitive practice. In fact,
the doctrine of allowing defendants to use procompetitivejustifications to
rebut the plaintiff’s case developed in this context. In Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System (“BMI”), owners of copyrighted
musical compositions agreed to a joint scheme that sold blanket licenses
to use all the compositions. The purpose and effect of the agreement was
to fix a single price for the blanket license, but the Court refused to
declare the arrangement per se illegal even if it constituted price fixing in
the “literal” sense.

238. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1984)
(“[J]udicial inexperience with a particular arrangement counsels against extending the reach
of per se rules.”); BMI, 441 U.S. at 10 (declining to hold a kind of price-fixing agreement
illegal per se because “[w]e have never examined a practice like this one before.”).
239. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 781.
240. PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court . . .
has backed away from any reliance on fixed categories andtoward a continuum.”).
241. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
242. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
243. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 781.
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Instead, the Court remanded the case for fact-finding and review
under the rule of reason.244 Flipping the per se rule’s confidence in judicial
experience, the Court seemed reluctant to condemn the blanket-licensing
agreement because of its unfamiliarity: it had “never examined a practice
like this before.”245 The Court went out of its way to point out to the court
on remand that the agreements might have beneficial effects on
competition. According to the Court, the unique contractual arrangement
created a product “quite different from anything an individual owner
could issue.”246 Blanket licensing significantly reduced the cost of making
licenses available (i.e.,production costs), “which is, of course, potentially
beneficial to both sellers and buyers . . . .”247 Furthermore, blanket
licensing is not merely the equivalent of licenses to multiple songs, but
“is composed of the individual compositions plus the aggregating service.
Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to some
extent, a different product.”248
The Court did not have to reach this issue of procompetitive effects,
nor did it have an evidentiary record with respect to it. Whether the per se
rule applied was the only antitrust-related question on which certiorari
was sought or granted.249 Nonetheless, the Court not only rejected
categorical analysis for a context-specific inquiry, but introduced the
influential rule that procompetitive justifications can save agreements,
including price-fixing agreements, despite their anticompetitive
effects.250 Moreover, the Court strongly suggested the licensing scheme
had such justifications.251

244. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. (BMI), 441 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1979).
245. Id. at 10.
246. Id. at 23.
247. Id. at 21.
248. Id. at 21–22.
249. Brief for Petitioners at 4, BMI, 441 U.S. 1 (No. 77-1583). The only other question in
the petition, which the Court did not address, was whether blanket licensing constituted a
“misuse of copyright.” Id.
250. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (“Broadcast
Music squarely holds that a joint selling agreement may be so efficient that it will increase
sellers’ aggregate output and thus be procompetitive.”). More recently, the Court stated that
some restraints on trade may have anticompetitive characteristics but nonetheless “stimulat[e]
competition [and] arein the consumer’s best interest.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct.
2274, 2284 (2018) (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
886 (2007)).
251. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
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The Court applied the same analysis to a price-fixing agreement in
NCAA v. Board of Regents, where the member universities of the
National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) agreed on
“recommended” prices for television rights to broadcast each game and a
cap on the total number of games each school could license. The
agreement constituted literal horizontal price-fixing and had the
demonstrated anticompetitive effect of raising the price and reducing the
supply of games for broadcast. The Court nonetheless considered the
NCAA’s counterargument that the agreement was “essential” to a
procompetitive purpose: the marketing of college football games, an
unusual and desirable product that benefited consumers.252
In both NCAA and BMI, the Court applied this relaxed antitrust
scrutiny because the challenged agreements allegedly enabled the
defendants to offer valuable products: college football and the blanket
license. While the Court ultimately rejected the argument in NCAA, it
treated it more favorably in BMI, where a network of agreements among
copyright owners was indispensable to creating a product “quite different
from anything an individual owner could issue.”253 Similarly, rideshare
companies assert that their product is not transportation, but connections
between riders and drivers. Insofar as this is accurate, contracts among
rideshare apps, drivers and riders are indispensable to the provision of the
product and deserve relaxed scrutiny.
C. Business Deference and the “Transaction Platform” Context
1. Ohio v. American Express, 2SPs, and Extreme Business
Deference
Like BMI, the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Ohio v. American
Express (“AmEx”) also involved contracts that enable unusual kinds of

620 F.2d 930, 937 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The entire trial in the District Court concerned primarily
the issue of whether direct licensing was feasible [as an alternative to blanket licensing].”).
Indeed, while the BMI opinion has become highly influential, the Second Circuit saw it merely
as a reversal on the per se issue and treated the rest of the opinion as dicta. Id. at 935. The
Second Circuit went on to affirm the district court’s holding that the licensing scheme had no
anticompetitive effect, and thus did not address the issue of procompetitive justifications. Id.
at 935–39.
252. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113–14. The Court ultimately rejected this argument because the
trial court had found that the agreement did not improve marketing. Id. at 114. Under a true
per se analysis, however, defendants would not even have had the opportunity to rebut. See
id. at 100.
253. BMI, 441 U.S. at 23.
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products. American Express was the Court’s first opinion to expressly
recognize the “structured” Rule of Reason,254 but at the same time, it
carved out an exception: a new and more lenient Section 1 analysis for
so-called “transaction platforms.”255 A transaction platform is a type of
“two-sided platform” (2SP). A 2SP is a business that facilitates
connections between members of two interdependent groups and
coordinates interactions between them. For example, a traditional
marketplace brings buyers and sellers together to enable sales
transactions.256 According to the AmEx Court, “credit-card networks are
aspecial type of two-sided platform known as a ‘transaction’ platform,”
distinguished by an especially high degree of interdependence among its
constituent parts.257 This increased interdependence derives from the fact
that a transaction platform “cannot make a sale to one side of the platform
without simultaneously making a sale to the other.”258 According to the
Court, these simultaneous, interdependent sales constitute a single
product—a “transaction.”259
According to the Court, American Express is a transaction platform
that connects a merchant and a cardholding shopper to make a charge
transaction possible.260 Similarly, a rideshare app would seem to qualify
as a transaction platform because it connects a driver and a rider to make

254. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284.
255. Id. at 2280.
256. David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate
Two-Sided Platforms, 2005COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 668 (2005).
257. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2277.
258. Id.. at 2280.
259. Id. at 2286. Here, the Court misconstrued the “simultaneous” relationship, and thus
the network effects, between the two sides of a charge-card transaction. Although the
cardholder and merchant must “simultaneously choose to use the network,” id., only the
merchant chooses to purchase services in any one transaction, because cardholders pay an
annual fee and no per-transaction fee (because anti-steering agreements forbid them). Id. at
2283. Thus, it is untrue that AmEx simultaneously “sells one transaction’s worth”, id. at 2286,
of services to a merchant and one to a cardholder. Cardholders never buy one transaction’s
worth of services. In other words, the marginal price of a transaction to the merchant is the
fee, while the marginal price to the cardholder is zero, and does not vary with the price to the
merchant. Thus, it is unclear why the network effects between merchant and cardholder
demand would be particularly strong. Rideshare, by contrast, is a better example of a
“transaction platform” as it does involve simultaneous, price-influenced purchasing decisions
on both sides of the platform by rider and driver.
260. See Evans & Noel, supra note 256, at 668.

2021]

RIDESHARE DRIVERS

851

a ride transaction possible.261 Because AmEx is a transaction platform,
the Court applied an unusually lenient antitrust analysis and favorable
presumptions about the competitive value of AmEx’s practices. As in
BMI, the Court focused on the valuable product being produced—
transactions—and believed the context was sufficiently novel that the
competitive effects of business conduct were difficult for a court to
predict. The Court thus cautiously declined to regulate the firm’s
contracts.
Every 2SP and the two groups it connects constitute an
interdependent system such that each of the three parts is unlike a buyer
or seller in the typical “one-sided” context. According to AmEx,
transaction platforms receive special antitrust treatment because this level
of interdependence is particularly high, creating a single integrated
network that produces a single product. The unusually close relationships
among the platform and its two sides mean that its economic value
derives from the way the three elements combine and operate as a
contractually created network. AmEx is special for antitrust purposes
because it is one part of a tripartite contractual network that produces
transactions. Uber and Lyft, along with their drivers and riders, each
makes up a similar three-part network. The principle of business
deference suggests that courts should be cautious about over-regulating
any of the contracts that make the network run, not only those, such as
vertical restraints, that favor the rideshare app, but also others, such as
horizontal contracts among drivers.
In the transaction context, as in BMI, it is not a corporation, but a
contractual network that is necessary to create the unique product worthy
of legal protection. Thus, lenient antitrust review of contracts should not
be limited to the corporation, such as AmEx or Uber, at the nominal center
of the network, but to the network as a whole. Contemporary corporate law
recognizes that a business firm is not an entity but a convenient shorthand
for a complex system of contracts: a “nexus of contracts.”262 According
to the originators of this influential theory, “it makes little or no sense to

261. Although the term “online platform” is often used to refer to web-based technologies,
“two-sided platform” simply means a mediating entity of some kind and has no technological
connotation. Indeed, a shopping mall orfarmer’s market could be considered a 2SP. Evans &
Noel, supra note 256, at 668.
262. See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976)
(“Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not onlywith employees but with suppliers,
customers, creditors, etc.”).
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try to distinguish those things which are ‘inside’ the firm . . . from those
things that are ‘outside’ of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude
of complex relationships (i.e., contracts).”263
2. Transaction Platforms in Ohio v. American Express
In AmEx, the Supreme Court explained how a transaction platform
and its two sides operate as a single interdependent network. A chargecard issuer like American Express provides a payment-processing service
and sells different aspects of it to cardholders and to merchants that join
its network. An issuer charges merchants a fee on each transaction, giving
merchants incentive to “steer” shoppers away from using cards that
charge higher fees. Most card issuers make money primarily from
cardholders’ interest payments. AmEx’s business model, however,
depends on merchant fees, not interest. AmEx thus charges higher
merchant fees than other card issuers.264 In addition, AmEx provides
cardholders with generous rewards that incentivize them to make more
and larger purchases.265 Because AmEx rewards spending, its customers
tend to have higher incomes and spend more.266 A merchant thus has
incentive to join the AmEx network in order to attract such customers
into the store. Once such a customer has decided to make a purchase,
however, the merchant has incentive to encourage them to use a different,
cheaper card in order to avoid the higher AmEx fee, a practice known in
the industry as “steering.” AmEx’s contracts with the merchants in its
network thus required them to agree not to engage in any form of steering.
In American Express, the Department of Justice and a number of
state governments challenged AmEx’s anti-steering agreements under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.267 Because AmEx provides a service to the
merchant that the merchant in effect resells to the customer as part of the
sale, the plaintiffs claimed that the anti-steering agreement was an
unreasonable restraint on the ways that a merchant can resell AmEx’s
product— in antitrust terminology, an illegal “vertical restraint.” The

263. Id. at 311.
264. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2282.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Visa and Mastercard, which formerly had anti-steering agreements, were also
defendants at trial and, along with AmEx, won on appeal to the Second Circuit. See id. at 2283
n.5. Before AmEx took the case to the Supreme Court, however, Visa and Mastercard signed
consent decrees renouncing their anti-steering practices. See id.
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Supreme Court ultimately held that the anti-steering agreements did not
violate Section 1.
The district court found a Section 1 violation after a lengthy trial.268
The plaintiffs had made their prima facie case based on both direct and
indirect evidence of anticompetitive effects. There was direct evidence
that card fees charged to merchants by all the major card issuers had risen
significantly since the prohibition of steering.269 The district court also
found indirect evidence in the form of market power over merchant fees.
Because merchants had to accept AmEx cards or face losing their
customers, AmEx had “the power to repeatedly and profitably raise their
merchantprices without worrying about significant merchant attrition.”270
By preventing merchants from favoring the cheapest card network,
AmEx caused “an absence of price competition among American Express
and its rival networks”271 and “‘disrupt[ed] the normal price-setting
mechanism’ in the market.”272 American Express argued in its defense
that the agreements had procompetitive justifications, but the trial court
found them unconvincing.
The Second Circuit reversed the trial court, and the Supreme Court
affirmed the reversal. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the antisteering agreements had caused merchant fees to increase. However, they
found that the plaintiffs’ prima facie case was faulty because it was based
on an incorrect definition of the relevant “market.” According to the
Court, AmEx is a “two-sided platform” (2SP) and more specifically a
“transaction platform.”273 As such, it serves a “two-sided market” that
includes not only the merchants in its network, but also its
cardholders.274 The plaintiffs’ direct evidence failed, as it showed a price
increase on only the merchant side of the market, and not in the overall

268. The trial transcript was almost 7,000 pages long, including the expert testimony of
four economics professors, and was accompanied by over 1,000 exhibits. United States v. Am.
Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d and remanded, United States v.
Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 200 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
269. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 151.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2275, 2294 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 148, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)).
273. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280.
274. Id. at 2286.
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two-sided market.275 The Court did not expressly address the indirect
evidence of market power with respect to merchant fees,276 but that too
concerned only one side of the market and thus would fail under the same
logic.
In economic theory, a 2SP serves two distinct but interdependent
groups of customers.277 The 2SP supplies a different product to each
group, but the demand for each product depends in large part on the level
of demand for the other product. For example, carrying a credit card is
more valuable to shoppers if more merchants accept it, and accepting the
card is more valuable to merchants if more shoppers carry it.278 Similarly
a rideshare app is more valuable to drivers if more riders use it, and vice
versa.
This interdependence affects the way prices are determined. Because
demand volume on each “side” of the platform is interdependent, it
follows that the prices the 2SP charges each of the twosides are also
interdependent. For the typical (i.e., “one-sided”) firm, price determines
business volume in a simple way: as price goes up in a given market,
demand (and therefore volume) goes down, and vice versa. Unless costs
or demand increase, a rise in price is (“direct”) evidence of
anticompetitive effects.
The 2SP theory holds that the determinants of price and output are
much more complicated for 2SPs. Because demand on each side of the
platform has a complementary effect on demand on the other side, the
price the platform charges on each side depends on the interactions
between each side of the platform. The prices “depend in a complex way
on the price elasticities of demand on both sides, the nature and intensity
of the indirect network effects between each side, and the marginal costs
that result from changing the output of each side.”279
Because of this interdependence, maximizing output and, thereby,
revenue depends not only on the price the firm charges on one side or the
other, and not even by the total price itself, but by the price structure: how
275. Id. at 2287 (“Evidence of a price increase on one side of a two-sided transaction
platform cannot by itself demonstrate an anticompetitive exercise of market power.”).
276. Indeed, the Court stated that the plaintiffs’ case was based “exclusively on direct
evidence.” Id. at 2284.
277. Evans & Noel, supra note 256, at 668. The Court’s opinion cited this article heavily.
278. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280–81 (citing DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD
SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 25 (2016)).
279. Evans & Noel, supra note 256, at 681.
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the platform allocates the total price between the two sides.280 When
network effects are sufficiently strong, “two-sided platforms cannot raise
prices on one side without risking a feedback loop of declining
demand.”281 To maintain overall volume under such conditions, a price
increase on one side will necessitate a countervailing decrease on the
other.
The Court declared that AmEx, as a “transaction platform,” had
sufficiently strong network effects to create these self-balancing
conditions. A card transaction occurs only when the merchant and
cardholder simultaneously agree to use that card network.282 Due to this
simultaneity, “two-sidedtransaction platforms exhibit more pronounced
indirect network effects and interconnected pricing and demand.”283 This
close connection means a two-sided transaction platform in effect does
not supply two products (e.g., merchant services and cardholder services),
but supplies two consumers (merchant and cardholder) simultaneously
with a single product—a “transaction.”284
Due to the high level of demand interdependence, the Court held that
AmEx could not simply raise merchant fees without initiating a “feedback
loop of declining demand:” merchant demand for AmEx services would
not only decline, decreasing cardholder demand, which would further
decrease merchant demand, and so on, reducing AmEx’s total business
volume and revenues. AmEx’s increased merchant fees did not indicate
anticompetitive effects unless cardholder fees had also increased.285 That
is, plaintiffs would have had to show an increase in the aggregate price of

280. Id. at 673 (quoting Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An
Overview 40 (March 12, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with MIT),
https://web.mit.edu/14.271/www/rochet_tirole.pdf) (“A market is two-sided if the platform
can affect the volume oftransactions by charging more to one side of the market and reducing
the price paid by the other side by an equal amount; in other words, the price structure matters,
and platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on board.”).
281. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285.
282. Id. at 2286.
283. Id. One commentator questions this characterization, arguing that “[m]ost of the
features scholars point to as evidence of the exceptionalism of platform companies are
defining characteristics of almost all service production,” but due to “bedazzlement by
platform technology . . . . we are more ready to believe that Uber intermediates a market, but
a restaurant does not intermediate a market between buyers of hospitality services (diners)
and sellers (waiters).” Tomassetti, supra note 35, at 6–7.
284. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286.
285. Oddly, however, the Court held for the defendants rather than remanding the case for
further factfinding. Id. at 2287.
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a credit card transaction.286
D. AmEx Created a New, Lenient Antitrust Analysis for the Transaction
Platform Context
The Court’s new analysis is significantly more burdensome for
plaintiffs and lenient toward transaction-platform defendants. First,
AmEx added a new element to the plaintiffs’ primary case by making
market definition a threshold question. “To assess this evidence,” the
Court stated “we must first define the relevant market.”287 This is a
significant departure from existing doctrine. As noted previously, the
ultimate question in any antitrust case is always the same: how the
defendant’s conduct affects competition.288 Market definition is merely
one tool for identifying market power;289 market power—the defendant’s
ability to dictate price—is merely a form of indirect evidence that the
conduct had anticompetitive effects.290 If there is direct evidence of
anticompetitive effects in the form of price increases, demonstrating
market power is unnecessary, rendering formal market definition
unnecessary.291 AmEx changed this rule in the 2SP context.
Second, AmEx further increased the burden on plaintiffs by rejecting
evidence of price increases (or, presumably, market power) unless it
applied to both sides of the platform. Under standard antitrust analysis, a
market is made up of products that can replace one another292: for
example, “whether merchant-related and shopper-related services are

286. Id. at 2286 (“Price increases on one side of the platform . . . do not suggest
anticompetitive effects without some evidence that they have increased the overall [price] of
the platform’s services.”).
287. Id. at 2285.
288. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (“[T]he essential inquiry
[in a §1 case] remains the same—whether or not the challenged conduct enhances
competition.”).
289. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 7 (2010).
290. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109–10. See also Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2297 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that nosingle firm can produce anticompetitive effects in the absence of
market power (citing Ind. Fed’n of Dentists v. FTC, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986))).
291. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2296 (Breyer. J., dissenting) (citing Ind. Fed’n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61).
292. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) (a relevant
market for antitrustpurposes is made up of “commodities reasonably interchangeable by
consumers for the same purposes . . . .”).
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substitutes, one for the other, so that customers can respond to a price
increase for one service by switching to the other service.”293 A two-sided
market is not based on substitutability: merchants cannot respond to an
increase in merchant fees by becoming cardholders, nor can cardholders
respond to an increase in annual fees by joining the merchant network.294
The broader definition of the relevant market makes it harder to
prove a relevant price increase or market power. Facts that constitute
evidence of anticompetitive effect in other contexts are rendered
irrelevant by new theoretical arguments. Outside the 2SP context, the
increase in merchant fees would have constituted direct evidence of
anticompetitive effect, and AmEx’s ability to raise merchant fees without
losing customers would have constituted indirect evidence. The
transaction platform analysis rejects that evidence based on the theory
that two-sided markets areself-balancing: a price increase on merchants
alone does not have anticompetitive effect because it necessitates a price
decrease on the consumers.295
Because the AmEx Court recognized no anticompetitive effects, the
defendants were not required to show any procompetitive effects. The
Court nonetheless cited such effects, relying on the 2SP theory rather than
evidence. Indeed, the only demonstrated benefit was AmEx’s receipt of
increased merchant fees. There was no evidence of benefits to cardholders
or other parties. Citing assertions of “expanding output and improved
quality,” however, the Court stated that competition among credit card
companies had increased.296
Moreover, the transaction platform argument is inherently based on
the procompetitive value of the anti-steering agreements. The antisteering agreements increased merchant fees, but were not shown to have
increased cardholder fees; that is, they altered the allocation of the total
transaction price as between merchants and cardholders. The heart of 2SP

293. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2298 (Breyer. J., dissenting).
294. Id. The trial court also found that merchants constituted a market under the so-called
“hypothetical monopolist” test. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 187
(E.D.N.Y. 2015). Under that variation on substitution analysis, a given product constitutes a
relevant market if, hypothetically speaking, a monopolist of that product could impose a small
but significant and non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”) “without losing so many sales
to other products that its price became unprofitable.” Id. at 176 (quoting United States v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
295. The Court was not moved by evidence that AmEx did not use all of the merchant price
increases to benefitcardholders. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288.
296. Id. at 2289.
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theory is that a 2SP maximizes volume not by transaction price alone,
but by how it allocates the total transaction price. 297 By deferring to the
anti-steering agreements, then, the Court was presuming they had the
procompetitive effect of maximizing volume. Indeed, AmEx may even be
read to reverse the burden of proof for 2SPs. It appears to be the plaintiff’s
burden to disprove the asserted procompetitive effects of the defendant’s
conduct.298 American Express did not have to prove that increased prices
on merchants generated offsetting price reductions to cardholders.
(Indeed, as noted above, the trial court found that AmEx did not use all
of the revenue from increased merchant fees to benefit cardholders.)299 It
only had to assert the possibility of such an effect to convince the Court
that the government had incorrectly defined the market and thus had
failed to show an anticompetitive effect. Thus, it appears that the plaintiff
must prove that a price increase on one side of a 2SP did not cause price
reductions on the other side.
According to the Court, this lenient antitrust review is appropriate
for a special subset of 2SPs: “transaction platforms,” whose two sides
have especially “pronounced indirect network effects and interconnected
pricing and demand.”300 The Court found AmEx to be a transaction
platform based solely on its intuitive application of 2SP theory, citing no
evidence of heightened interdependence between merchants and
cardholders. Thus, the Court appears to declare as a matter of law that
evidence of a “one-sided” price increase or market power is insufficient
whenever a defendant plausibly claims to be a “transaction platform.”
Like American Express, rideshare apps are 2SPs, and more
specifically transaction platforms that bring members of two
interdependent user groups together to consummate a single
simultaneous transaction. Uber describes itself as a medium where virtual
297. Evans & Noel, supra note 256, at 673 (quoting Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole,
Two-Sided Markets: An Overview 40 (March 12, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
MIT)), https://web.mit.edu/14.271/www/rochet_tirole.pdf (“A market is two-sided if the
platform can affect the volume of transactions by charging more to one side of the market and
reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount; in other words, the price
structure matters, and platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on board.”).
298. See JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY 183 (Harv. Univ. Press 2019) (“If . . . feedback analysis is incorporated into market
definition, courts would be expected tobalance in-market harms and benefits, so the plaintiff
must disprove offsetting benefits as part of its prima facie case. That approach is friendlier to
platform defendants.” (emphasis added)).
299. See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 215.
300. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2278.
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marketplaces bring together transaction participants, including riders and
drivers.301 Uber’s driver agreement states, “We are not hiring or engaging
you to provide any service; you are engaging us to provide you access to
our Platform.”302 Lyft’s S-1 similarly portrays both driver and riders as its
customers: “We provide a service to drivers to complete a successful
transportation service for riders. This service includes on-demand lead
generation that assists drivers to find, receive and fulfill on-demand
requests from riders . . . .”303
E. Drivers Deserve the Same Lenient Antitrust Review as Platform
Firms
1. Drivers and Transaction Platform Networks
As Justice Breyer argued in his dissent, the Court argued that 2SPs
are distinct from other firms, but did not explain why that distinction
makes a difference for market definition purposes.304 TheAmEx Court’s
decision to define the relevant antitrust market based on interdependence
of demand not only lacked doctrinal precedent, but also was not dictated
by economic theory. It was a policy decision. Even if two sides of a
platform exhibit highly interdependent demand, it does not follow that
they constitute a single “market” for antitrust purposes. (As noted
previously, markets are typically defined by substitutability, not demand

301. Uber, Platform Access Agreement § 11.1 (Jan. 6, 2020) (“We are not hiring or
engaging you toprovide any service; you are engaging us to provide you access to our
Platform.”). Uber has claimed that only drivers are its “customers:” riders are not “customers”
because they use its app without charge. Uber Technologies, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Form
S-1 Registration Statement 144-45 (Form S-1) (April 26, 2019). Uber likely took this position
in hopes of reducing its liability exposure to riders for driver misconduct or accidents. For
purposes of AmEx’s 2SP theory, however, the fact that riders use the app for free is irrelevant.
Apps are transaction platforms that connect drivers on one side to riders on the other.
Moreover, rideshare apps are “free” to customers only in narrow literal sense. Apps charge
the rider by setting fares and taking their revenues from those fares.
302. Uber, Platform Access Agreement § 1.1 (Jan. 6, 2020).
303. Lyft, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1 Registration Statement 102 (Form S-1)
(Mar. 18, 2019).
304. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2297. The majority based its approach to market
definition on the close relationship between merchant and cardholder services. As the dissent
observed, however, “‘Grouping complementary goods into the same market’ is ‘economic
nonsense’” that has no relation to “‘the rationale for thepolicy against monopolization or
collusion.’” Id. at 2295–96 (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW 431 (4th ed. 2011)). Gasoline and tires, for example, are
complementary products, but the price of tires does not limit a gasoline seller’s ability to raise
its prices. Id.
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interdependence.) Evans and Noel, leading 2SP theorists heavily cited by
the AmEx Court, avoid the term “two-sided market” because “market” is
“a term of art for competition policy.”305 As economists, not lawyers or
regulators, Evans and Noel choose to focus on a firm’s response to
network effects between its customer groups and try to avoid commenting
on the relevant unit of analysis for regulatory purposes.
Doctrine aside, the Court’s larger point appeared to be that price
increases on one side of a transaction platform are self-correcting. If a
platform increases prices on one side, the Court reduced them on the
other. The AmEx Court held it was the plaintiff’s burden to show that this
correction had not happened. That presumption rests on the notion that
merchant demand and cardholder demand are highly interdependent. But
the Court did not explain how to prove that interdependence is
sufficiently high, nor did it cite any evidence showing that demand
interdependence was in fact high.
AmEx is easier to understand as an example of business deference.
While demand interdependence is a characteristic of transaction
platforms, their uniqueness derives from their product: transactions.
AmEx was not concerned with interdependent markets per se, but with
protecting transactions (more precisely, the contracts involved in
producing them) from potentially harmful antitrust actions. The
redefinition of markets in AmEx is best understood as a doctrinal tool for
achieving this by raising the burden of proof on plaintiffs. The Court
viewed credit transactions as a valuable product and the contractual
networks that create them as a useful business practice. In such a context,
courts are hesitant to predict the competitive effects of contracts, and thus
hesitant to regulate them.
As argued above, the Court’s rejection of the per se approach
demonstrates a refusal to presume that business decisions have
anticompetitive effect, particularly in novel contexts. In BMI, the
perceived novelty of blanket licensing led the Court to reject the per se
rule and instruct the trial court to consider procompetitive benefits. In
AmEx, the perceived novelty of transaction platforms led the Court to go
significantly further: it not only presumed procompetitive justifications
without evidence, but also used them to rebut proven anticompetitive
effects. Furthermore, while the contracts in BMI were the very

305. Evans & Noel, supra note 256, at 672. They further point out that “two-sided market”
is a confounding term because it is used variously and inconsistently to refer to 2SPs and to
the customer groups they serve. See id.
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contracts that created the blanket license, the anti-steeringagreements
did not directly create transactions, but restricted the behavior of
merchants and raised their price.
The vertical restraints in AmEx, like the horizontal blanket license in
BMI, received relaxed antitrust scrutiny not because of any specific
economic characteristic of the defendant firm, but because the Court saw
the product as unusual and complex.306 The Court cited nothing unusual
about the copyright owning entities in BMI. The Court’s deference to
their actions was based on its unfamiliarity with the product and inability
to predict how the contracts would affect competition. Given that lack of
confidence, it was unwilling to call it anticompetitive, despite its
resemblance to price-fixing.
Insofar as the deference in AmEx is to the business that produces
transactions, it should extend not only to agreements that benefit the
platform app, but to all the contracts that make up the interdependent
network required to produce transactions. The unit of analysis in antitrust
law andeconomic regulation has historically been the “firm,” which is
typically identified with a corporation. AmEx, however, states that
“transactions” are produced not by platform corporations, but by the
intertwined relationships among platforms and their two “sides.”
Similarly, contemporary corporate theory recognizes that a “firm” is not
a unitary entity with fixed boundaries, but a series of interconnected
contracts among independent actors. Legal entities like corporations
serve only a formal function; they do not define the bounds of the
productive unit, which encompass more than the corporation. This is
especially true with respect to a “postindustrial corporation” that does not
merely make widgets in its factory, but generates wealth through
relationships, outsourcing and financial transactions.307 The relevant
focus of inquiry is not an entity, such as AmEx or Uber, but the sum of
“a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals . . .
are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual
relations.”308 Under this view, “there is . . . no core, no hierarchy . . . no
firm . . . . Instead, there is a set of interrelated agreements or relationships

306. The AmEx opinion acknowledged that earlier Court cases had dealt with 2SPs such
as publications that serve readers and advertisers, but distinguished them as less complex than
“transaction platforms.” Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286.
307. See Tomassetti, supra note 35, at 7 (stating Uber is a “postindustrial corporation, an
entity whose formal boundaries bear little relation to the organization of productive activity”).
308. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 262, at 311.
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among all participants in an economic activity—equity holders, debt
holders, managers, workers, suppliers, and customers.”309 Thus, Uber and
Lyft are corporations, but those are merely legal entities. The relevant
economic unit that produces ride transactions is the tripartite network that
includes drivers and riders as well as the corporation.
Insofar as AmEx gives antitrust deference to a “transaction
platform,” it is because it is a part of such a network, not because it is the
most important part. Thus drivers, no less than rideshare firms, should
benefit from that deference. Drivers add an additional dimension of
novelty, further confounding judicial expectations and justifying
business deference, in that they fit poorly into established employeeindependent contractor categories; indeed, drivers are a new hybrid of
independent contractors, employees and consumers.310 Insofar as they fall
into the residual legal category of independent contractor, however, each
driver is the equivalent of a small business firm.The Court has given
AmEx, a massive, dominant firm in the 2SP context, a presumption that
its contractual innovation is procompetitive; drivers in the 2SP context
should be afforded the same presumption if they contract among
themselves to bargain collectively.
If AmEx’s lenient version of the rule of reason applies only to the socalled platform providers and not to rideshare drivers, the doctrine would
move antitrust law away from its traditional focus on the welfare of
consumers and toward a focus that favors the welfare of firms. After all,
the 2SP model starts by identifying a firm’s profit-maximizing level of
output and presumes that procompetitive benefits flow therefrom. That
is, it would imply that theoretical benefits to firms are enough to establish
that conduct is procompetitive, but theoretical benefits to consumers are
not. (As noted above, rideshare apps portray drivers as consumers of app
services, akin to riders. Similarly, the 2SP model treats both sides of a
platform as a single “market,” meaning drivers arepart of the same market
as riders.) Furthermore, it would imply that large firms are entitled to a
presumption that their contractual innovation is procompetitive, but

309. G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 947 (2000).
310. Uber, Platform Access Agreement § 1.1 (Jan. 6, 2020) (“We are not hiring or
engaging you to provide any service; you are engaging us to provide you access to our
Platform.”). Lyft’s S-1 also portrays drivers ascustomers. See Lyft, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to
Form S-1 Registration Statement 102-103 (Form S-1) (Mar. 18, 2019) (“We provide a service
to drivers to complete a successful transportation service for riders. This service includes ondemand lead generation that assists drivers to find, receive and fulfill on-demand requests
from riders . . . .”).
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independent contractors (thatis, small independent businesses) are not.
More bluntly, a refusal to apply a lenient antitrust standard to workers in
the transaction platform context would indicate a bias in favor of capital
over labor.
2. Antitrust Review of Drivers’ Collective Action
Given that drivers’ contracts merit lenient antitrust review under
transaction platform theory, what are the relevant arguments? As a
threshold matter, labor agreements among rideshare drivers mightbe said
to differ from anti-steering agreements and rideshare-app contracts in that
they are “horizontal” agreements among rivals, as distinct from “vertical”
restraints imposed down the supply chain. But the significance of the
horizontal-vertical distinction, like categorical antitrust analysis
generally, has withered away.311 As noted above, the per se rule for
horizontal price-fixing has been supplanted by the rule of reason.312 As
two prominent commentators have put it, “the Court has consistently
moved in the direction of a unitary rule of reason that focuses antitrust
analysis on competitive effects. ”313
As noted above, the redefinition of “markets” in AmEx is merely one
doctrinal tool for making antitrust review more deferential to the
production of transactions. It need not be applied literally to every
transaction platform contract. Drivers, as a different part of the
transaction network, may not serve “two-sided markets” like platforms
do, but they are equally indispensable to transaction production and thus
equally deserving of antitrust leniency. In all antitrust cases, “the essential
inquiry remains the same—whether or not the challenged restraint
enhances competition.”314 As we have seen, a defendant may survive that
inquiry by either a lack of anticompetitive effects or the presence of
procompetitive effects. In the transaction context, AmEx held that the
evidentiary burden of showing anticompetitive effects is very high, while
procompetitive effects can be shown by theory and conjecture and require
no evidence.

311. See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil & Jordan L. Ludwig, The Many Sides of Ohio v. American
Express Co., ANTITRUST, 2018, at 8, 12.
312. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103; Broad. Music Inc.
v. Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc.,, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979).
313. See, e.g., Gavil & Ludwig, supra note 314, at 12.
314. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104.
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Drivers’ collective labor action would likely increase the price
platforms pay for labor. That would constitute a horizontal price-fixing
agreement, likely with anticompetitive price effects. But even if so, BMI
indicates drivers should have the opportunity to rebut with procompetitive
justifications. As Part II of this Article shows, rideshare industry is a
duopoly with a strong bargaining power advantage over drivers and has
used its wealth and influence to tilt the law in its favor. Although they
may not rise to the level of “market power” in antitrust doctrine,
counterbalancing those advantages may have procompetitive effects by
mitigating anticompetitive tendencies in the industry.
AmEx holds that one-sided market power threatens competition,
because a transaction platform system is self-correcting: a price increase
on one side necessitates a countervailing price decrease on the other side.
Because this self-correction is the putative engine of competitive pricing
in transaction platform networks, antitrust law should remove
impediments to the self-correcting process. Collective bargaining by
drivers may have this effect by serving as a counterweight against the
anticompetitive characteristics of the rideshare industry. For example, as
noted previously, the industry has used its wealth and influence to lobby
for favorable legislation. Individual drivers cannot engage in such
activity, but concerted driver action could. As will be discussed below,
concerted driver action could be a counterweight to the industry’s highly
concentrated structure, its overallocation of costs to drivers, and, most
important, the potential for predatory pricing.
Courts should not require much, if any, evidence to support these
arguments. As explained above, AmEx suggests that procompetitive
arguments in the transaction context are subject to a very low standard of
proof. Although the Court has stated in passing that Section 1 seeks to
determine whether “anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive
effects,” it has not indicated what showing by defendants would be
sufficient to rebut a prima facie case. It is unclear whether it is sufficient
merely to convince the court that a significant procompetitive effect exists
or whether itmust literally be shown to be larger than the anticompetitive
effects. No reported case has requiredan empirical balancing approach.315
While logically appealing, that proposal raises difficult (if notimpossible)
issues of empirical measurement. The BMI Court’s suggestion that
blanket licensing was procompetitive was plausible, but it would be

315. See GAVIL, KOVACIC, BAKER, & WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 256 (3d
ed. 2017).
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difficult (if not impossible) to quantify the procompetitive value of any
business practice, all the more so for an entirely new practice, such as the
blanket license or a labor combination among rideshare drivers. Due to the
futility of empirical measurement, courts in practice appear to consider
not the relative magnitude of effects, but the weight of the evidence.316
The AmEx Court departed from this trend, however: it rejected evidence
of market power and price increases, and found procompetitive effects,
based primarily on economic theory. Similarly, courts should impose a
low evidentiary bar on rideshare drivers asserting procompetitive effects
of collective labor action.
a. Counteracting Firms’ Allocation of Costs to Drivers
Rideshare companies allocate a high proportion of the cost of a ride
transaction to drivers. As noted above, they keep their costs down by
shifting them onto drivers. This low driver pay suggests either a lack of
choice in the job market or information asymmetries about real net pay.
Just as AmEx dominated the charge-card market, Uber and Lyft control
virtually the entire U.S. rideshare market.317 This dominance is selfreinforcing due to network effects: riders tend to use only the dominant
apps because most drivers do, and vice versa.318 2SP theory suggests that
allocating costs to drivers would reduce driver demand for rideshare apps,
necessitating lowering rider prices. Evidence suggests, however, that
drivers have little bargaining power in the face of industry concentration.
The average net pay for Uber drivers (fares earned less Uber’s share and
the driver’s vehicle expenses) is $11.77 per hour.319 In some markets, net
pay is below minimum wage.320 In comparison, the average hourly wage
for all private-sector workers is $32.06 and the average for service
workers is $14.99.321
It might be argued that rideshare companies’ ability to shift costs
onto drivers is merely one-sided market power. But while AmEx held that

316. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009).
317. Bosa, supra note 12. While Lyft is focused in North America, Uber has a wider
international presence, where it competes with local rivals. Bellon, supra note 12.
318. Hemingway, supra note 15.
319. Lawrence Mishel, Uber and the Labor Market, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (May
15, 2018),http://epi.org/145552.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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one-sided market power is not the equivalent of “market power,” it did
not hold that it entirely lacks significance as an anticompetitive effect.
Under the 2SP theory’s own logic, one-sided market power diminishes
the feedback effects between the two sides of the platform and thus
diminishes the necessity of offsetting a one-sided price increase witha
price decrease on the other side. This is illustrated by the district court’s
finding that AmEx had the power to raise merchant prices without losing
business: an increased merchant price had onlya limited downward effect
on merchant demand, and thus had only a limited downward effect on
cardholder demand, and so on.
Similarly, rideshare apps ability to shift costs onto drivers appears to
disrupt the feedback effect between driver price and customer price,
resulting in inefficient pricing.322 Collective bargaining by drivers could
have a procompetitive effect by counteracting apps’ one-sided market
power. As described above, rideshare apps unilaterally prescribe fares
(including “surge” increases) and the percentage of each fare that goes to
the app; they impose further costs on drivers by requiring themto supply
their own vehicles and by controlling the details of their work. Like the
merchants in AmEx, drivers are prohibited from recovering their costs by
charging a higher fare or imposing surcharges.323 This “‘disrupt[s] the
normal price-setting mechanism’ in the market.”324 In AmEx, the antisteering provisions “created a barrier to allowing cardholders to react to
the total charge,”since merchants could not charge specifically for the use
of AmEx, or even tell shoppers about the higher cost of AmEx.325

322. Horan, supra note 4, at 34–35 (“The price signals that allow drivers and customers to
make welfare maximizing decisions have been deliberately distorted” by the shifting of costs
onto drivers).
323. The anti-steering agreements in AmEx were less disruptive of the feedback link
between merchants and cardholders, because a merchant could indirectly pass on fee increases
by raising all its retail prices. The disruption of demand interconnectivity in the rideshare
context might arguably disqualify drivers and riders from constituting aunitary “two-sided
market.” As noted above, however, the AmEx Court focused solely on the generic qualities of
“transaction platforms” and paid no attention to the context-specific facts that might disrupt
interconnectivity.
324. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2294 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 209). The anti-steering provisions “created a
barrier to allowing cardholders to react to the total charge,” since merchants could not charge
specifically for the use of AmEx, or even tell shoppers about the higher cost of AmEx. Jeffrey
L. Harrison, Ohio v. American Express: Misunderstanding Two-Sided Platforms; the Charge
Card “Market;” and the Need for Procompetitive Justifications, 70 MERCER L. REV. 437, 446
(2019). Similarly, drivers cannot impose markups based on the fees they pay to Uber.
325. Harrison, supra note 324, at 446.
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Similarly, rideshare apps’ unilateral control over fares means the app, and
not market forces, determines how much of their costs drivers can pass
on to riders.326
b. Counteracting Predatory Pricing and Misallocation of Capital
With only two firms, the rideshare industry is extremely
concentrated. Antitrust law looks skeptically at extreme concentration
in an industry, because a small number of firms can more easily engage
in collusive behavior. The antitrust analysis of mergers is predicated on
the idea that “where rivals are few, firms will be able to coordinate their
behavior, either by overt collusion or implicit understanding.”327
While concentration increases the danger of anticompetitive
collusion, the industry seems to be moving in the opposite direction.
Rideshare firms have allocated more of the aggregate ride price to drivers
in order to reduce rider prices and seize market share. Rideshare firms
continue to attract investment capital and their stock prices continue to rise
despite their unprofitability.328 This is not because the firms expect to
reduce costs and make operations profitable in the foreseeable future.329

326. In response to the passage of AB5 and other legislative definitions of “employee,”
however, Uber announced itwould allow drivers in California and some other states to mark
up Uber’s fares. While some drivers object to Uber’s price-setting policies, an Uber rider has
sued the company on the theory that its practice of “surge pricing,”or raising fares in response
to demand spikes, is a price-fixing conspiracy with drivers. After losing in customer
arbitration, the plaintiff appealed in federal court on the ground that the arbitrator ruled against
Uber out of fear of retaliation. Tina Bellon, Uber Customer Claims Company Won PriceFixing Suit Because Arbitrator Was Scared, REUTERS (May 22, 2020, 6:34 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-lawsuit/uber-customer-claims-company-won-pricefixing-suit-because-arbitrator-was-scared-idUSKBN22Y2
ZZ.
327. United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 77 (D.D.C. 2011); see also
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 7.1 (Aug. 19, 2010) (suggesting
that mergers that eliminate rivals in concentrated markets are likely to attract antitrust
investigation because they may facilitate cartelization among theremaining competitors).
328. Lyft’s stock price jumped 15% and Uber’s 10% after they reported respective net
losses of $398.1 million and $2.9 billion for the first quarter of 2020. Lora Kolodny, Lyft
Shares Jump 15% As Company Reports More RidersThan Last Year Despite Coronavirus,
CNBC (May 6, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/lyft-earnings-q12020.html; Lora Kolodny, Uber Shares Shoot up After CEO Says Ride Volume Is Increasing
Again
After
April
Bottom,
CNBC
(May
7,
2020,
6:15
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/07/uber-uber-earnings-q1-2020.html.
329. In early 2020, before the pandemic, Uber predicted a profitable fourth quarter for
2020, but a $1 billion loss forthe year, while Lyft predicted it would not reach profitability
before the end of 2021. Bellon, supra note 12.
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Rather, with the backing of investment capital, they seek to conduct
costly fare wars to take market share from one another and from taxi
businesses, as well as from public transportation.330
Price wars are generally thought to benefit consumers and
competition, but under certain conditions, they can have destructive
effects in the long run. Artificially low prices for rideshare transportation,
subsidized by investment capital and underpaid drivers, may be
inefficiently allocating resources to support an unprofitable and possibly
unsustainable industry.331 Because the rideshare business model is
consistently losing money and offers no significant economies of scale,
the only apparent way to make profits is to destroy rivals in the fare wars
and then raise prices to profitable levels.332 A firm is guilty of illegal
“predatory pricing” if it sets prices below marginal cost in order to
eliminate its rivals and use the resulting market power to recoup its losses
by increasing prices.333 Many observers believe this is the only logical
endgame of the rideshare industry.334 Although predatory pricing is rare
and difficult to prove, it is the only foreseeable way the rideshare industry
can become profitable. Rideshare firms’ persistent power to attract
investors despite their unprofitability suggests that Wall Street believes

330. Kate Conger, Uber’s First Earnings Report After I.P.O.: $1 Billion Loss, N.Y. TIMES
(May 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/technology/uber-stock-earnings.html;
Steven Hill, Ridesharing Versus Public Transit, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://prospect.org/infrastructure/ridesharing-versus-public-transit/r.
331. It is possible that neither Uber nor Lyft will ever become profitable or will do so only
in radically scaled-down form. Can Amazon, Uber, and Lyft All Thrive After the
Coronavirus?, N.Y. MAGAZINE: INTELLIGENCER (May 1, 2020), https://nymag.com/intel
ligencer/2020/05/can-amazon-uber-and-lyft-all-thrive-after-the-coronavirus.html. In that case,
founders and others who cashed out early will have profited through paper wealth creation,
leaving behindlosing investors and a hollowed-out transportation supply. Id.; Hill, supra note
330. Indeed, whether it survives or not, ridesharing threatens to decimate public
transportation, with disastrous impacts on income distribution, pollution and traffic. Id.
332. Jeff Spross, Uber Is Basically Promising Investors it Will Become a Monopoly, THE
WEEK (Apr. 15, 2019), https://theweek.com/articles/834836/uber-basically-promisinginvestors-become-monopoly.
333. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 209
(1993).
334. Hill, supra note 330. Taxi companies recently sued Uber, alleging predatory pricing
in violation of California unfair competition law. Uber Techs. Pricing Cases, No. A154694
(Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist. Mar. 23, 2020). The California Court of Appeals dismissed without
reaching the merits, holding that Uber was exempt from the statute because the state utilities
commission had jurisdiction to regulate its rates.
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in can subsidize price wars in exchange for future profitability.335 One
observer has suggested the institution of price floors to protect
competitors, particularly public transportation, from predatory pricing.336
While that approach makes economic sense, it is practically
inconceivable in the current deregulatory climate.
Contract and market forces, however, can inhibit predatory pricing
if antitrust law permits driversto organize. As integral elements of the
rideshare transaction platform network, drivers’ contracts deserve the
same business deference as platform firms’ contracts. Under a lenient
approach to the rule of reason, even if driver organization were to increase
labor prices, such anticompetitive effects would be outweighed by
procompetitive effects. Based on the Court’s reasoning in AmEx,
procompetitive effects could be established by theoretical arguments and
would require no empirical proof.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that employment laws are increasingly irrelevant
in the platform context, where fewer and fewer workers qualify as
employees despite being subject to a high degree of control. In addition,
antitrust doctrine has traditionally prevented independent contractors
from protecting themselves through collective bargaining. Over the past
several decades, however, the Supreme Court has shown a tendency to
apply deferential antitrust scrutiny to agreements in certain complex and
novel contexts, particularly in the so-called “transaction platform
context.” This lenience should apply to collective bargaining by rideshare
drivers (and potentially by other platform workers).
Employment laws fail to protect rideshare drivers because the
“employee-independent contractor” distinction is a poor fit with the
platform economy. The tests for determining employment status—rightto-control, economic opportunities, and entrepreneurial opportunity—
focus on traditional workplaces. Courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies have deemed drivers to be independent contractors despite the
extensive control that rideshare companies have over their work
activities. Although some courts have found drivers to be employees, the
fight over employee status is now being conducted in the legislative arena.
335. Can Amazon, Uber, and Lyft All Thrive After the Coronavirus?, supra note 331.
(“[Uber will] be a smaller business . . . . And quite frankly, riders should be paying more. So
there just needs to be a redistribution of stakeholder value here.”); Hill, supra note 330.
336. Hill, supra note 330.
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While some state legislatures have sought to define drivers as
independent contractors, a majority of states have enacted industrysponsoredstatutes with a relatively hands-off approach to substantive
regulation of rideshare companies. Most have, in effect, redefined
“independent contractor” such that drivers and other “gig” workersare not
“employees” despite platform companies’ extensive control over them.
Antitrust law provides an opportunity to rectify the imbalance of
power in the rideshare company-driver relationship. While labor
organizing by independent contractors has been called “per se illegal,” in
fact the Supreme Court’s AmEx opinion is part of a long trend away from
categoricalantitrust analysis and toward context-sensitive and deferential
review of business agreements, particularly in the context of innovative
products. The AmEx Court created new, extremely deferential antitrust
standards to protect platform-mediated “transactions.” Although the
platform company was the defendant, the AmEx Court’s basis for
deference was the special nature of transactions: they are produced by a
complex network involving the platform and its two sides. The relaxed
antitrust standard of review for the platform in AmEx thus paves the way
for similar lenient treatment of other agreements in the transaction
platform context, such labor organizing among drivers. Concerted
activity by drivers may have procompetitive effects by counteracting
predatory pricing and other anticompetitive effects.
We acknowledge that many drivers and their advocates will be
reluctant to give up on employment law and concede that drivers are
independent contractors under antitrust law. We certainly do not want to
inhibit efforts to expand employment law protections to more workers,
including drivers. In jurisdictions where drivers qualify as employees or
receive some other statutory protections, labor organizing may serve as
an adjunct, or it may prove unnecessary. But employment law protections
are off the table in those states with statutes expressly denying employee
status to drivers. In those jurisdictions, it may be time to consider
replacing employment law with a new legal paradigm for worker
protection. The option of organizing would also appeal to those rideshare
drivers and other gig workers who prefer to be independent contractors
rather than employees.337
Additionally, critics of corporate power may resist the AmEx opinion

337. Kim Kavin, I Don’t Want To Be Anybody’s Employee, REASON (Aug./Sept. 2020),
https://reason.com/2020/07/05/i-dont-want-to-be-anybodys-employee/.
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and the general trend toward lenient antitrust doctrine.338 The broad trend
of lenience in antitrust law may be troubling in its implications for
corporate power, but it cannot be denied, and is likely to persist in light
of the markedly conservative shift in the makeup of the federal bench. It
may be more realistic to argue for formally symmetrical application of
the lenient approach (to both capital and labor) than to seek a more drastic
reversal of the trend.
The fight over the definition of “employee” demonstrates how
stagnant employment law has become. We argue that drivers, as small
businesses, can make agreements with each other to counteract the
anticompetitive effects of the rideshare business model, antitrust law and
the NLRA notwithstanding. At this moment in legal history, this contractbased solution is a politically realistic way to advance workers’ interests.
Sometimes the answer to a vexing, complicated and long-standing legal
problem is simply to look to a different area of law.

338. Cf. Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 392 (2019)
(arguing that labor advocatesshould be wary of adopting the consumer welfare standard
because of its potential anti-labor consequences).

